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ABSTRACT 
To understand the likely impact of federal policies on nonpoint agricultural water pollution, a 
robust measure of state-level environmental regulation stringency is required. The objective of this 
paper is to derive and characterize state-level environmental regulation stringency across states and 
over time. I compute a measure of environmental regulation stringency for the agricultural sector 
from 1960-2004 by calculating the shadow price of polluting inputs. The estimation provides 
evidence suggesting an increase in regulation stringency across all regions over the sample period, 
with the exception of the Corn Belt (Heartland) and the Northern Crescent regions, which have 
decreased in stringency. With few exceptions, regions of the U.S. with the highest proportion of 
farms see the lowest levels of regulation stringency.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The environmental impact of agriculture on the environment can be categorized in terms 
of water, soil and air, though these are not mutually exclusive in some cases. The most significant 
of these impacts are those of water and soil, and much of environmental protection efforts in 
agriculture are geared towards soil and water conservation.  Environmental protection is the core 
mandate of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the reason for its creation. The EPA 
monitors, sets standards and enforces regulations to enhance environmental protection. Whereas 
the agricultural community in the U.S. frequently expresses concerns about the burden of recent 
EPA regulations, public health and environmental advocates are in support of EPA regulations, 
and are of the opinion that these regulations are too loose for the agricultural sector (Stubbs, 
2014). Whether environmental regulations are too loose or too tight on the agricultural sector, 
there is likely to be variation across states. This is because the federal policies that set guidelines 
for environmental protection are applied and enforced at the state level. Knowing how much 
environmental regulation stringency varies across states will inform policy decision on which 
states, or regions government should put in more effort in achieving acceptable water quality 
standard. 
Agricultural activities sometimes create negative impact on the environment, and the 
magnitude of the impact varies over time and across states (Stubbs, 2014). Water is one of the 
major natural resources that is affected by the use of some synthetic inputs in agricultural 
production (Reimer, Gramig, and Prokopy, 2013). Majority of agricultural water pollution is 
nonpoint source (NPS), meaning that the pollution comes from diffuse sources, as opposed to 
point source, which refers to a single identifiable source of pollution. 
The agricultural sector is the largest contributor to NPS water pollution (Dowd, Press, and 
Los Huertos, 2008; Reimer, Gramig, and Prokopy, 2013). As such, one might expect that 
environmental restrictions to monitor water quality would be geared mainly towards the 
agricultural sector given that the major sources of water pollution are nonpoint sources. But 
regulation of NPS pollution is difficult and expensive to regulate due to the diverse source of 
such pollution. However, the severity of the problem, considering that close to 50% of water 
bodies are in poor conditions (EPA,2016), warrants effort to overcome this difficulty.  
Some states have voluntarily imposed regulations and provided incentives to fight 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution. The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) component of 
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the Clean Water Act (CWA) makes provisions for states to identify impaired waters and obtain 
funding from the EPA to help establish plans to limit pollution.  Some states have also imposed 
taxes on polluting farm inputs (Ribaudo, 2001). Nebraska, for example, imposed an input tax on 
fertilizer to limit over-application and improve water quality (Dowd, Press and Los Huertos, 
2008), though it expired in 2000 and has not been reinstated. 
In addition to these voluntary restrictions and the TMDL program, policies that influence 
commodity choice, production, input use, and land management affect the level of agricultural 
water pollution as well. The Farm Bill is one of the major forces influencing such policies. 
Through direct commodity payments, acreage allocation under the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), crop insurance subsidies, and programs designed to incentivize the adoption of 
Best Management Practices (BMPs), like the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
the Farm Bill is likely to be a significant influencing factor in the amount of agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution ending up in U.S. waterways. These programs can change the relative price of 
polluting inputs and outputs. Thus, they impose implicit “costs” on pollution. 
Though the policies that influence these programs are implemented at the Federal level, 
their application, in terms of monitoring, enforcement and permitting, is carried out by state and 
local governments based on the federal EPA guidelines (Stubbs, 2014). States determine the 
means of attaining the goal of the federal regulatory measures, and the stringency of the 
implemented regulations are also determined by the state regulators. This implies that there may 
be variation in the stringency of regulations across states. As such, the impact of federal 
regulations on water quality improvement will partly depend on the environmental regulatory 
stringency of each state. Environmental regulatory stringency is defined by Botta and Koźluk 
(2014, pp.6) as “the ‘cost’ imposed on polluting or other harmful environmental activity”. 
Federal policies such as the Clean Water Act and the Farm Bill have direct effects on 
agricultural water pollution, but they also exert indirect effects. Individual states increase the 
relative stringency with which state-level environmental regulations are applied when the 
potential for water pollution increases (Lawley and Furtan, 2008). For example, if CRP acres 
were to decrease in a new Farm Bill, state-level regulators may perceive a higher potential for 
water pollution, subsequently increasing their environmental regulatory stringency. Thus, there is 
likely to be state-level variation in environmental regulatory stringency, even though the Clean 
Water Act and the Farm Bill are implemented at the federal level. Several other factors could 
account for variation in environmental regulatory stringency across states. Reimer, Gramig, and 
Prokopy (2013) note differences in EQIP application rates across all 50 U.S. states. They 
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attributed this difference to variations in state settings such as topography and the major 
agricultural products they engage in that influence behaviour of individual farm operators  
State-level enforcement could also account for variation across states. The 1980s saw a 
disparity in regulation stringency among states when the Federal Government delegated 
regulation to state authorities (Kraft and Vig, 1990; Lester, 1994; Levinson, 1996). California 
also subjected fertilizer sales to a 0.3% tax to support research and extension on handling of 
fertilizers and also placed a mill tax of $ 0.0175 per dollar of pesticide to generate funds to 
support education, data collection and growing training purposes (Dowd, Press, and Los Huertos, 
2008).   
Deriving a measure of environmental regulatory stringency is a necessary first step in 
determining how effective federal NPS policies will be if they are applied and enforced at the 
state level. Theoretically consistent empirical studies use the shadow price of polluting inputs 
(Althammer and Hille, 2016; Pittman, 1981; van Soest, List, and Jeppesen, 2006 (hereafter 
referred to as VLJ)), or polluting output (Huhtala and Marklund, 2008; Mamardashvili, 
Emvalomatis, and Jan, 2016) as a measure of environmental stringency. Unlike other non-
shadow price techniques, the shadow price approach is based on the firm’s input and output 
decision making (firm’s behaviour). By identifying polluting inputs in the agricultural sector: 
pesticide, fertilizer, herbicide, and energy, and using agricultural output and input data of states in 
the U.S. over time, I derive a measure of environmental regulatory stringency using the shadow 
price following VLJ (2006). 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
The literature on environmental regulatory stringency is extensive. Most of the literature 
focus on international trade competitiveness and testing of the pollution haven hypothesis 
(jurisdictions with weaker environmental regulations attracting polluting industries relocating 
from more stringent jurisdictions) (Akbostanci, Tunc, and Turut-Asik, 2007; Herath et al., 2005; 
Jaffe et al., 1995; VLJ , 2006). Studies examining environmental stringency in the agricultural 
sector focus primarily on the animal sector (Huhtala and Marklund, 2008; Mamardashvili et al., 
2016), which omits the difficulties of accounting for the nonpoint source pollution from crop 
production. One significant work in the U.S. agriculture sector is Herath et al. (2005). They 
create an index for environmental regulatory stringency by compiling state-level regulatory effort 
into a single index. This approach is ambiguous in reflecting the characteristics of the policy 
since some government regulatory efforts can be cost-reducing and others can be cost-increasing 
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(Brunel and Levinson, 2016), and can be inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory (it does 
not reflect the behaviour of the firm). 
 
1.3. Objective 
The main objective of this thesis is to determine how environmental regulatory stringency 
of the agricultural sector varies across U.S. states and over time. This objective will be achieved 
by pursuing the following specific sub-objectives: 
1. To estimate a generalized Leontief cost function. 
2. To derive the wedge between the shadow price and the market price of polluting inputs 
 
1.4. Justification 
This study provides a starting point to a bigger project that seeks to understand how 
policies in the Farm Bill and the CWA along with state-level institutions help mitigate water 
pollution from farms.  The study provides a theoretically consistent measure of environmental 
regulation stringency in the U.S. agricultural sector. The measure covers the entire agricultural 
sector and not just the crop or animal sector. The study provides information that will help in 
identifying the trend and pattern regarding how environmental regulations are set across regions 
in the U.S. It provides important input for other analyses. For instance, to understand how 
Federal policies or state-level institutions influence the level of environmental regulations, it will 
first require an estimation of the stringency level. My work provides these estimates, making it 
possible for such an analysis. It will also be useful in understanding how environmental 
regulation stringency affects water pollution. The approach used in this study can be easily 
adapted to analyze the agricultural sectors of other countries. Finally, this study will fill a 
significant gap in the environmental regulatory stringency literature relating to agriculture. 
 
1.5. Organization of thesis 
The next chapter reviews the literature on the contribution of agriculture to water 
pollution, proposed regulatory measures, and issues relating to the measurement of 
environmental regulation stringency. Chapter 3 explains the theoretical rationale and empirical 
models I use to estimate stringency. The data used in the estimation is also described in this 
chapter. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results from the estimations in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 
summarizes the research results, presents conclusions on the environmental regulatory stringency 
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across regions, and lists the limitations of the thesis. Areas for future research are also provided 
in this chapter.
6 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Controlling nonpoint water pollution 
Degradation of water quality resulting from agricultural production systems is a serious 
and increasing problem in many parts of the world, including the United States (Reimer et al., 
2013).  A recent EPA report classified more than half of the nation’s rivers as “poor” (EPA, 
2013).  
High nutrient load in an aquatic ecosystem stimulates algae blooms resulting in plant 
death and decay (Craig and Roberts, 2015; Cullum, Locke, and Knight, 2010; Ongley, 1996; 
Walters et al., 2012). This condition, referred to as eutrophication, is a natural process which is 
accelerated by human activities that increase the rate at which nutrients and organic substances 
enter waterways. Nitrogen and phosphorus discharge into water bodies remains one of the 
primary accelerators of eutrophication (Craig and Roberts, 2015; FAPRI-UMC, 2007; Howarth 
and Marino, 2006; Parris, 2001), and  agriculture is the main contributor (Cartwright, Clark, and 
Bird, 1991; Pretty et al., 2003; Novotny, 1999 ). 
The major challenge for policy makers in combating water pollution is nonpoint source 
pollution (Dowd et al., 2008). This could be due to the difficulty in identifying NPS polluters, 
and the difficulty in measuring NPS pollutants. If nonpoint polluters can be easily identified and 
there is clear understanding of the damage by each polluter as well as the implicit cost imputed to 
such damages by policies, then policy makers can know to what extent policy should be tighten 
or loosen to achieve a particular standard. 
Point source pollution can be regulated by Pigouvian taxes, standards or permits, but the 
same cannot be said of NPS pollutants. Xepapadeas (2011) identifies input-based instruments, 
ambient schemes and the application of monitoring technology in combination with standard 
polices as a means of controlling NPS pollutants. Input-based instruments rely on a positive 
correlation between a particular input and the pollution created such as fertilizer use and nitrogen 
runoff. Applying a mix of taxes, subsidies or permits related to the use of the input can yield 
efficient results, and accounting for adverse selection will yield the most efficient result if such 
correlation exists (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Laffont, 1994; Shortle and Abler, 1994). An 
ambient tax is based on the difference between the observed ambient concentration of pollution 
relative to some cut-off level and it is levied on all potential polluters in the area (Cabe and 
Herriges, 1992; Hansen, 2002; Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 1998; Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 
1992). NPS pollution can be transformed into a point source pollution problem that can be 
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regulated through policies if information regarding individual emissions can be acquired through 
truthful revelation or monitoring technology (Xepapadeas, 1995, 1994). The NPS pollution 
problem is due to the unidentifiable nature of the pollution. If there is a way of knowing how 
much emission is caused by any identified individual polluter, then the NPS problem becomes a 
point source problem which can be regulated easily through policies. 
Federal and state governments implement environmental regulations to control nonpoint 
source pollutants, which indirectly affects the price of outputs and inputs associated with 
increasing water pollution. However, the effectiveness of these regulations in achieving the goal 
of water quality improvement is likely to depend on environmental regulatory stringency, or the 
cost of polluting activities. This cost can either be explicit such as expenditure on pollution 
prevention or implicit such as the shadow price of a polluting input or output (Brunel and 
Levinson, 2016; VLJ, 2006).  
Some states have also made efforts to control nonpoint pollution from agriculture. To 
reduce nitrogen loss, Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Vermont imposed some form of ban on 
winter application of manure or fertilizer; Wisconsin used buffers and nutrient management plans 
in 2011; Pennsylvania and Minnesota have adopted buffers near rivers and lakes to reduce 
pollution of rivers from agriculture; and in 1998, North Carolina implemented mandatory BMPs 
to reduce runoff into the Neuse River Basin (Kling, 2013). Another state-based effort to reduce 
pollution from agriculture is the Everglade Act; passed in 1994 with the intention of reducing 
phosphorus in the Everglades Agricultural Area located southeast of Lake Okeechobee. This Act 
requires farmers in the area to obtain permits indicating compliance with conservation actions 
before growing crops (Kling, 2013). Virginia, Utah, New York, New Mexico, Montana, 
Missouri, Iowa and Georgia also use nutrient standards as a means of regulating pollution from 
agriculture (Herath et al., 2005).   
  
2.2. Agricultural policies and environmental regulatory stringency 
The Farm Bill and the Clean Water Act (CWA) are two major policies in the U.S. with 
environmental protection elements. The environmental protection elements in the Farm Bill 
include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Environmental Quality Improvement Program 
(EQIP), and other payments such as the federal crop insurance program. These policies and 
programs are interpreted at varying degrees by state regulators. How state regulators interpret 
federal policies at the state level is likely to influence the effectiveness of federal policies.  
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The CRP is a voluntary program which entitles producers with eligible land to enter into a 
contract with the government to establish cover on environmentally sensitive land to reduce 
erosion, improve soil quality and enhance wildlife habitat (FAPRI-UMC, 2007). The policy 
retires environmentally sensitive land from crop production and compensates owners for 
enrolment. The CRP limits the amount of chemicals deposited into waterways, as cover 
established on lands under the program does not require fertilizer application, and also reduces 
runoff by improving soil structure and texture. Improvement in water quality is also achieved 
through less fertilizer usage because acres under the program cannot be used for crop production. 
Comparing CRP lands planted with trees with land under crop production at the Beasley Lake 
Watershed, Cullum, Locke, and Knight (2010) note lower nutrient load and sediments leaving the 
watershed in CRP lands with tree establishment. Figure 2.1 shows the number of acres enrolled 
in CRP across states as of March 31, 2016. There is a substantial amount of variation in CRP 
acreage across states. When state-level differences such as size and industrial composition is 
accounted for, variation in CRP enrollment may influence water pollution and regulation 
stringency. When payments under the CRP are used to cultivate other lands as compensation for 
lands enrolled under the program, or increase in dirty input use, it is likely to result in laxity in 
regulations no change (or increase) in water pollution level. However, if due to enrolment under 
the program there is reduction in productive land and dirty input usage then one can say 
regulations are stringent and water quality level is expected to improve. 
 Broussard, Turner and Westra (2012) identify a positive relationship between government 
payments from the Farm Bill and increasing nitrogen concentration in rivers, commodity 
specialization, increased fertilizer application and reduction in crop diversity. Hendricks et al. 
(2014) study the relationship between higher corn prices resulting from ethanol subsidies and the 
subsequent expansion of the hypoxic zone (low-oxygen below the requirement for aquatic 
survival caused by excessive nutrient pollution) in the Gulf of Mexico. Fewer farmers choose to 
alternate between corn and soybeans as ethanol subsidies increase and corn becomes relatively 
more profitable. Soybeans is a leguminous crop hence rotation between corn and soybeans will 
require less nitrogen fertilizer application than planting a corn continuously. The continuous 
planting of corn may require more nitrogen and subsequently, more nitrogen may leave the field 
in the form of runoff. However, the rate and amount of runoff may vary across states depending 
on the intensity of agricultural activities, topography and climatic conditions of each state. The 
above studies indicate that payments in the Farm Bill (examples include income support, 
commodity-specific payments, direct commodity payments and rural development programs) are 
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likely to lead to water quality deterioration. This may be due to laxity in regulation as a result of 
the payments, and hence, the positive correlation between these payments and water pollution. 
These programs tend to affect the relative prices of polluting inputs such as fertilizer and 
pesticide though the payments do not directly affect their prices. The sum of the market price and 
the price wedge reflects the willingness to pay (shadow price) for a polluting input. 
 
Figure 2.1: CRP Enrollment (total acres per state) - March 31, 2016 
     Source: USDA-FSA 
 
EQIP is another component of the Farm Bill with direct implications on water quality. 
The primary focus of this program is to protect ground and surface water and to enhance efficient 
usage of water (USDA-NRCS, 2014). The program funds investment in equipment that can 
improve irrigation efficiency, structures and land leveling that can reduce water loss and runoff as 
well as management practices to precisely control the timing and rate of water application on 
irrigated fields. The application rate for EQIP differs across states (Reimer et al., 2013) (Figure 
2.2). A higher proportion (60%) of funding from EQIP is allocated to livestock-related 
conservation (Wallander and Hand, 2011). This implies that states with high livestock 
concentration will receive a larger share of EQIP funding than states with more crops even if they 
have the same application rate. The states in Figure 2.2 (Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, and 
California) showing the highest number of completed and active contracts are also major 
locations for livestock production. These factors may result in difference in stringency across 
states since states may differ in their industrial composition. 
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The Clean Water Act, which is the primary federal law in the U.S. regulating discharge of 
pollutants into the nation’s water bodies, was enacted in 1948 with the name Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), and was later reorganised and expanded into the Clean Water 
Act in 1972 (Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.). The main objective of the Act is to restore 
and maintain the quality of water bodies by preventing point source pollution (EPA, 2016). The 
Clean Water Act employs both regulatory and non-regulatory tools to reduce direct pollutant 
discharges and establish ambient water quality standards. The Act also provides assistance to 
publicly-owned treatment facilities for the improvement of wastewater treatment and helps 
maintain the integrity of wetlands. Despite the fact that the CWA does not place any direct 
regulation on agricultural nonpoint water pollution (Valcu, 2013), it could create heterogeneity in 
stringency across states since the initial water pollution level may vary across states. Like the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs), the ambient water quality standards of the 
CWA imply that all states face the same federal-level stringency. However, states with higher 
initial pollution levels will have to implement stricter regulations to meet the national standard, 
leading to variation in stringency across states. 
Map Source: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS), Soil 
Survey and Resource Assessment 
(SSRA), Resource Assessment Division 
(RAD) Beltsville, MD July 2016 
 
Figure 2.2: Differences in EQIP completed and active contracts across states 
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Another policy that may affect prices faced by farmers is crop insurance. Like other 
payments in the Farm Bill, federal crop insurance may also influence the relative quantity of 
inputs used. Crop insurance has the potential to impact acreage decisions and the quality of land 
used in planting, both of which influence water quality. If a farmer has land with corn and grass, 
there is likely to be a shift of more land from grass to corn production since corn is an insured 
crop. Wu (1999) studies the impact of crop insurance for corn on chemical use in the Central 
Nebraska Basin. He finds that insurance predictably shifts land use towards corn, which increases 
chemical use and nonpoint source pollution leading to the deterioration of water quality. 
Evidence of the impact of crop insurance on soil erosion is mixed. Walters et al. (2012) indicate 
that the crop insurance impact varies significantly by geographical area, with some areas 
improving in environmental indicators and others declining. Claassen, Langpap, and Wu (2016) 
also estimate the relationship between federal crop revenue insurance, land use, cropping system, 
and environmental quality in the U.S. Corn Belt region, finding that insurance marginally 
decreases CRP and pasture acreage. Consequently, their model predicts a negligible detrimental 
effect of federal crop revenue insurance on environmental quality. However, they also concluded 
that the impact of the policy on environmental quality might vary across different regions. 
 
2.3. Measuring environmental regulatory stringency  
Measuring environmental regulatory stringency is necessary for policy inference, 
particularly across jurisdictions, but the measure comes with several challenges. Several factors 
ranging from data availability to differences in industrial composition across jurisdictions 
account for this difficulty. Brunel and Levinson (2016) identify four challenges to environmental 
regulatory stringency measurement: (1) multidimensionality—which exists because 
environmental policies or regulations control several different types of pollutants; (2) 
simultaneity emerges because pollution can influence stringency and vice versa; (3) variation in 
industrial composition across jurisdictions; and (4) the issue of capital vintage, which means 
regulations may be stricter for new firms than existing firms. 
Several empirical approaches have been adopted to measure environmental regulatory 
stringency. Brunel and Levinson (2016) classify environmental regulatory stringency into five 
categories: i) direct assessment of individual regulations, ii) composite indices, iii) measures 
based on pollution or energy use, iv) measures based on public sector efforts, and v) private 
sector abatement costs. Each of these measurements has strengths and weaknesses. The five 
classifications are not mutually exclusive, but they include the most important body of literature. 
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Adopting the classification of Brunel and Levinson (2016), the body of literature covering the 
various measurement approaches are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Direct assessment of individual regulations encompasses a stream of literature that 
focuses on specific regulations. These measures are useful where there is a change in policy or 
introduction of a new policy. Their strength lies in assessing the direct effects at a micro level, 
where other variables can be controlled for, differenced out or ignored (Botta and Koźluk, 2014). 
These measures are used to overcome two key challenges with measurement of policy and 
regulatory stringency: simultaneity and multidimensionality (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). 
However, the external validity of results using this measure is limited (Brunel and Levinson, 
2016). External validity is limited due to the narrow focus on individual regulations and the use 
of natural experiments (Deaton, 2010).  Also, individual regulations may vary across 
jurisdictions, making it difficult to create a consistent regulation-based measure of stringency 
(Althammer and Hille, 2016). This method cannot be applied to this study since this work is 
accessing all implemented regulations that can influence water quality. 
The second  type of measure, composite index, summarises the observable laws, which 
are mostly multidimensional into a synthetic representative measure by aggregating individual 
indicators on the basis of the underlying model into a holistic index (Botta and Koźluk, 2014). 
For example Knill et al., (2012) develop an indicator of clean air policy that captured national 
statutory laws in the books by coding the different clean air laws of countries as either “policy 
expansion” or “policy dismantling”. Though composite index measures attempt to solve the 
multidimensionality problem by compressing multiple regulations into a cardinal value which 
might provide a complete description of the legislative setting, the result could be misleading if 
selection of policies, weights scored, and aggregation are poorly constructed (Botta and Koźluk, 
2014). The measure may also be measuring the overall quality of institution rather than only 
environmental regulatory stringency. This approach is not adopted in this study because of the 
problem of simultaneity and identification that characterised the approach as a result of 
respondents decision influenced by economic fluctuations (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). 
The third category, measures based on pollution or energy use, uses emission, ambient 
pollution or energy use as a measure of policy stringency. Xing and Kolstad (2002) use high level 
of pollution from sulphur as evidence of laxity in regulation. McConnell and Schwab (1990) use 
high pollution as indication that regulations are not stringent with the assumption that 
government will be forced to tighten regulations to deal with the problem. This inherent 
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simultaneity constitutes a main disadvantage of indices based on pollution or energy use (Brunel 
and Levinson, 2016), and the reason why it will not be appropriate for this study.  
Fourthly, public-sector environmental efforts are sometimes used by researchers to 
measure stringency with the merit of incorporating an enforcement dimension (Brunel and 
Levinson, 2016).  Levinson (1996) created such a measure by using number of employees at the 
state environmental agencies relative to the number of plants in the state. Higher relative number 
of employees indicates stringent regulation policy. Alternatively, Magnani (2000) use public 
expenditure on Research and Development (R and D) to create a measure of policy stringency. In 
general, using public-sector effort as a proxy for stringency has been less used, perhaps because 
its shortcomings overweigh the importance. The use of this measure for proxy creates ambiguity 
in the measurement because some public expenditure such as tax incentives and subsidies reduces 
private cost (Brunel and Levinson, 2016).  
The last category, which is a common approach to measuring environmental regulatory 
stringency, is to determine private sector pollution abatement costs, which reflect the relative cost 
of firms’ production in a given jurisdiction relative to others as a result of complying with 
regulations. Surveys are usually used for the collection of data on abatement cost, and industry 
managers are mostly the respondents. For instance, Levinson (1996) and  List and Co (2000) use 
the annual U.S. Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) data: the most 
comprehensive example for this type of survey data. Generally, the idea of the surveys is to 
determine a cardinal number of cost that directly coincides with the data needed to measure 
stringency. Firms report all abatement cost, some of which may not be due to regulatory 
stringency. Brunel and Levinson (2016) identified two major problems associated with this 
approach: (1) respondents might not be able to correctly separate expenditure due to 
environmental regulations from others such as profit seeking investment, and (2) regions with 
larger industries are more likely to record higher level of pollution and subsequently higher 
abatement cost. Pasurka (2008) adds that international comparison using different surveys is 
difficult. This approach may also under-or overestimate cost for new firms since only expenditure 
for existing firms are represented (Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih, 2001). An alternative approach 
to using the firm’s expenditure for estimating stringency is by using the shadow price of polluting 
inputs or output. 
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2.4. The shadow price approach 
The shadow price approach is an attempt to avoid the problems associated with the cost 
survey. The measure relies on economic theory and firm input choices, and reflects the fact that 
implicit prices are placed on pollution by environmental regulations. VLJ (2006, p. 1155) define 
the shadow price of an input as “the potential reduction in expenditure on other variable inputs 
that can be achieved by using an additional unit of the input under consideration (while 
maintaining the level of output).” That is, in the absence of regulations, firms can maximize their 
profits by using more dirty inputs and fewer “clean” inputs since the price of dirty inputs 
becomes lower in the absence of regulations. 
 Assuming that firms are profit maximizers, the shadow price can be determined by 
estimating the firm’s cost function using the data on the level of output, quantity of inputs and the 
prices of all inputs. The shadow price of the polluting input is then derived as the sum of the 
market price of the polluting input and the estimated wedges from the cost function. In the case 
where the polluting input is considered as a quasi-fixed input, the price of the polluting input is 
not required. The shadow price of the polluting input is determined from the cost function as a 
derivative with respect to the quantity of polluting input. 
Several articles use the shadow price approach to estimate pollution abatement cost. 
Coggins and Swinton (1996) and  Fare et al. (2005) estimate the shadow price of sulfur dioxide 
emissions in the electricity generation sector as pollution abatement cost. Huhtala and Marklund 
(2008) estimate the shadow price of manure spread in the animal sector as a measure of 
stringency in Finland dairy from 1994 to 2002. Another article focusing on the animal sector 
estimates the shadow price of a “dirty” output, nitrogen surplus, interpreting it as a measure of 
pollution abatement cost of Swiss diary farms (Mamardashvili et al. 2016). VLJ (2006) 
considered energy as a polluting input and measured the shadow price for the heavy metal and 
food processing industries for nine Western European countries from 1978 to 1996. The shadow 
price approach is theoretically consistent and allows comparability over time as well as across 
jurisdictions that adopts different types of regulations.  The shadow price can be compared to the 
undistorted market price as markets are sufficiently integrated internationally (VLJ, 2006).  A 
shadow price lower than the market value is interpreted as laxity in regulations, and when 
shadow prices are higher than market prices regulations are said to be stringent. VLJ’s approach 
is extended by Althammer and Hille (2016) to cover 28 OECD countries, 33 sectors, and from 
1995 to 2009. Althammer and Hille (2016) estimate shadow prices of emission-related energy 
use as a measure of carbon policy stringency. 
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One setback of the shadow price approach is that the stringency measure does not cover 
regulations that do not affect the shadow price. For instance, if a firm self-imposes a restriction 
on “dirty input usage” the shadow price is not affected (Althammer and Hille, 2016). Also, the 
results are partly affected by the functional form assumption (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). 
Correctly estimating the shadow price also partly hinges on correctly accounting for 
technological changes. Another limitation to the shadow price approach is that there could be 
other reasons apart from environmental regulations that could make market price diverge from 
the shadow price. For example, allocative inefficiency and other regulations on inputs other than 
dirty inputs (example, labour regulations) could result in the shadow price diverging from the 
market price. These effects cannot be separated from the sole impact of environmental 
regulations on dirty input if they exist, possibly leading to under-or-over-estimation of the price 
wedge as a measure of environmental regulatory stringency. 
These notwithstanding, the shadow price approach has very desirable advantages.  The 
problem of multi-dimensionality associated with environmental regulation is converted into a 
cardinal measure of cost (Brunel and Levinson, 2016).  The shadow price approach also controls 
for capital vintage and industrial composition (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). With the 
incorporation of substitution possibilities between factors of production into the model, the 
approach is also able to deal with integrated technologies – technologies adopted to enhance 
productivity or maximize profit (Althammer and Hille, 2016). In addition, data is more readily 
available for this approach, and the shadow price can be estimated across time, regions and for 
several pollutants (Brunel and Levinson, 2016; VLJ, 2006). Considering all factors, the shadow 
price is a more promising approach for determining environmental regulatory stringency.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
Optimal firm decisions require equivalence between marginal private benefit and 
marginal input cost. Marginal benefit can be measured as the marginal value product of an input 
when using the profit maximization approach. With cost minimization however, it can be 
measured as a reduction in expenditure on other inputs with a unit increase in the input under 
consideration while output level is maintained (VLJ, 2006). A profit-maximizing firm in a 
perfectly competitive industry will use inputs to the level where the benefit derived from using an 
additional unit of input is equal to the cost of the input, which coincides with cost minimization. 
However, environmental regulations can cause adjustment in the input cost and disrupt the 
equivalence between marginal cost and marginal private benefit required for an optimal input 
decision (Morrison-Paul and Macdonald, 2003). These regulations are government interventions 
that are used to control negative externalities from the private sector. This externality is not 
accounted for in the profit maximization or cost minimization condition when no regulations are 
in place. The discrepancy between marginal cost and marginal private benefit can be captured as 
a wedge between the shadow price and the market price. 
To find the input demand response to these regulations, the concept of duality can be used 
directly through the profit function (Hotelling, 1932), or indirectly through the cost function 
(Shephard, 1953). However, the cost function is relatively more appealing: it allows for the 
estimation of a system of factor demand equations that are consistent with cost minimization and 
a general specification of technology; and variables that are omitted from the model but are 
observed by producers can influence the production decision and error term in the production 
function, but might not necessarily influence factor prices to the same degree in the cost function 
(Farsin and Filippini, 2009). Using the cost function is also preferred because cost minimization 
can handle production technologies with constant and increasing returns to scale, making it more 
flexible.  
 VLJ (2006) created a measure of environmental stringency that is theoretically consistent 
and allows comparability over time as well as across jurisdictions adopting different types of 
regulations. The measure is based on a polluting input’s shadow price. When shadow prices are 
lower than the market prices, firms face lax regulations, perhaps due to subsidy in consumption 
of dirty inputs. On the other hand, shadow prices higher than the market price implies that firms 
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are charged for polluting actions. This in theory, will reduce the use of polluting input and 
increase the use of other inputs for cost minimization objectives. Alternatively, firms may adopt a 
better technology which will use less of the polluting input while maintaining the use of other 
inputs and yet minimize cost under the environmental regulations. By identifying dirty inputs 
used in agriculture such as fertilizer, pesticides, agrochemicals, and energy (such as fuel), and by 
adopting the framework of VLJ (2006), I use the shadow price of dirty inputs to derive a measure 
of implemented environmental regulatory stringency in the U.S agricultural sector.  
I define variable cost as 𝐶(𝐩, 𝐱, 𝑦, 𝑡), where p is a vector of variable input prices, x is a 
vector of quasi-fixed inputs used in production, y is output level, and t represents other arguments 
in the cost function such as technology or investment in the quasi-fixed input. The shadow price 
of polluting input d can be expressed as: 
 𝑍𝑑 =
𝜕𝐶(𝐩, 𝐱, 𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑑
, (1) 
if the polluting input is considered as a quasi fixed input, where 𝑍𝑑 is the shadow value of polluting 
input d. Furthermore, if total cost is denoted TC, the following relationship can be derived: 
 
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝑑
= 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑍𝑑 , (2) 
where 𝑝𝑑 is the market price of dirty input d. The wedge between the shadow price and the 
market price, 𝜆𝑑 = 𝑍𝑑 − 𝑝𝑑, can be used as an indicator of environmental regulations or policies 
that restrict firm’s polluting input use (VLJ, 2006). If the wedge, 𝜆𝑑, is negative then the firm is 
better off using more of the dirty input, indicating a laxity in regulation; alternatively, a positive 
wedge indicates stringent regulation. For instance, if government impose a tax on fertilizer the 
before-tax price (market price) is less than the after-tax price (shadow price). In this case the 
wedge becomes positive and farmers are better off using less of fertilizer (or coming up with 
innovative technology that requires less use of fertilizer). In the case of subsidy, the shadow price 
becomes less than the market price and firms are better off using more of fertilizer 
 
3.2. Empirical model 
For the purpose of estimation, a specific functional form needs to be specified for the cost 
function. The ideal choice is a highly general functional form that (1) places no a priori restriction 
on the substitutability between inputs; and (2) can be interpreted as a second-order approximation 
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to an arbitrary twice-differentiable cost function (Bernt and Wood, 1975). The generalized 
Leontief, normalized quadratic, and the translog cost functions are all sufficiently flexible. I 
utilize the generalized Leontief cost function for estimation as it satisfies all the criteria and is 
frequently used in the shadow price approach.  
 
3.2.1. The generalized Leontief functional form 
Diewert and Wales (1987) introduce a generalized Leontief cost function that expands the 
traditional form introduced by Diewert (1971), adding technical change and variable economies 
of scale. This was further extended by Morrison (1988) and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) to 
facilitate the inclusion of additional inputs, such as variable inputs where the shadow price can 
deviate from the market price. This functional form is linearly homogeneous in prices and allows 
for the derivation of input demand functions that are homogeneous degree zero and linear in 
parameters, facilitating estimation. The approach used in this work is the one adopted by 
Morrison-Paul and Macdonald (2003) and VLJ (2006) by considering polluting inputs as variable 
inputs. The approach nests the shadow price directly into the cost function and allows it to vary 
from the market price such that 𝑍𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑, where 𝜆𝑑 is the wedge driven between the shadow 
price and the market price due to environmental regulations as determined by the data. The cost 
function then reads as: 
 
𝐶 = 𝑦 [∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
0.5𝑝𝑗
0.5 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑖
0.5𝑧𝑑
0.5 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑑𝑒𝑧𝑑
0.5𝑧𝑒
0.5
𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖
] + 
𝑦 [∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑎  𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎
0.5 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑑𝑎 𝑧𝑑 
𝑎
𝑡𝑎
0.5
𝑑
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖 
𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑎𝑏𝑡𝑎
0.5
𝑏
𝑡𝑏
0.5
𝑎𝑎𝑖
+  ∑ 𝑧𝑑
𝑑
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑎𝑏 
𝑏𝑎
𝑡𝑎
0.5𝑡𝑏
0.5] + 
𝑦0.5 [∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑔 𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑔
0.5
𝑔𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖 
𝑖
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑎𝑔 
𝑔𝑎
𝑡𝑎
0.5 𝑥𝑔
0.5 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑑𝑣 𝑧𝑑 
𝑔
𝑥𝑔
0.5 + ∑ 𝑧𝑑 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑎𝑔 
𝑔
𝑡𝑎
0.5
𝑎
𝑥𝑔
0.5
𝑑𝑑
]
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑔𝑓 
𝑓𝑔
𝑥𝑔
0.5𝑥𝑓
0.5 + ∑ 𝑧𝑑 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑔𝑓 
𝑓
𝑥𝑔
0.5
𝑔
𝑥𝑓
0.5
𝑑
 
𝑖
 
(3) 
Subscripts i and j denote variable inputs for which the shadow price is assumed to be equal to 
market price; subscripts d and e denote variable inputs for which the shadow price deviates from 
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the market price; subscripts f and g denote the quasi-fixed inputs, and a and b denote the 
exogenous argument, t. The coefficients estimated are 𝛼, 𝛿, 𝛾,,  and 𝜆, where 𝜆 is derived from 
𝑍𝑑 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆𝑑. To facilitate the estimation of the coefficients in (3), I derive a demand function 
for each variable input using Shephard’s lemma. From (3), which I denote as 𝐶 = 𝐶(𝐩, 𝐱, 𝑦, 𝑡), 
the input demand functions are: 
 𝑋𝑖 =
𝜕𝐶(𝐩, 𝒛, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝐩𝑖
 (4) 
Alternatively, input-output ratios can be derived to reduce any potential heteroscedasticity 
(Morrison-Paul and Macdonald, 2003; VLJ, 2006). The relevant input-output ratios are  
 
𝑥𝑖
𝑦
=
1
𝑦
∗
𝜕𝐶(𝐩, 𝒛, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝐩𝑖
, and (5) 
 
 
𝑥𝑑
𝑦
=
1
𝑦
∗
𝜕𝐶(𝐩, 𝒛, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝒛𝑑
, (6) 
where 𝑥𝑑 is the input demand function for the dirty input. 
To estimate the econometric model, I use state-level farm production and input use data 
from the USDA. I estimate equations (3), (5) and (6) using seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR), with capital assumed to be quasi-fixed. Labour (N) and land (L) are assumed to be fully 
variable. Polluting inputs included are fertilizer (F), pesticide (PE), energy (E), and other 
agrochemicals (A). I allow the shadow price to deviate from the market price. This deviation is 
estimated as a proxy for environmental regulatory stringency. The time trend, t, is use to proxy 
for exogenous technological changes.  
The econometric model allows the direct effect of variable inputs ((𝛼𝑟,𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝑟,𝑁𝑁, 𝛼𝑟,𝐹𝐹, 
𝛼𝑟,𝑃𝑃, 𝛼𝑟,𝐸𝐸 , and α𝑟,𝐴𝐴), where r index for region) to vary by region, whereas interaction effects 
(𝛼𝐿𝑁 , 𝛼𝐿𝐹, 𝛼𝐿𝑃, 𝛼𝐿𝐸 , 𝛼𝐿𝐴, 𝛼𝑁𝐹 , 𝛼𝑁𝑃, 𝛼𝑁𝐸 , 𝛼𝑁𝐴, 𝛼𝐹𝑃, 𝛼𝐹𝐸 , 𝛼𝐹𝐴, 𝛼𝑃𝐸 , 𝛼𝑃𝐴, 𝛼𝐸𝐴, 𝛾𝐾𝐿 , 𝛾𝐾𝑁 , 𝛾𝐾𝐹 , 𝛾𝐾𝑃, 
𝛾𝐾𝐸, and 𝛾𝐾𝐴) and the quasi-fixed variable coefficient (𝛾𝐾𝐾) are equivalent across regions 
(Morrison, 1988; VLJ, 2006). Though equation (3) is homogeneous of degree one in input prices, 
global concavity in variable inputs and convexity in quasi-fixed input are not guaranteed.  
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3.2.2. Estimating the wedge 
The wedges can be captured either through the inclusion of annual jurisdiction-specific 
wedges 𝜆𝑟,𝑡, (where r denotes the regions and t denotes time periods) for polluting input prices, 
or time trend, or by including wedges for periods instead of a single time trend (VLJ, 2006). 
Using a single time trend to capture wedges will smoothen regulations and policies into a single 
time trend. To avoid this, I split the estimation period into 10 sub-periods (1960-65; 1965-70; 
1970-73; 1973-77; 1977-81; 1981-85; 1985-90; 1990-96; 1996-2002; 2002-04) based on each 
Farm Bill regime starting from the first omnibus Farm Bill in 1965. The wedges are estimated as 
a markup or markdown by including an interaction effect of dummy variables of each time period 
and regions. I allow the ten-period dirty input price wedges, 𝜆𝑟,𝑔, to vary across USDA Farm 
Resource Regions, which were created by the USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) to 
depict geographic specialization in the production of U.S. farm commodities. The states that 
constitute each USDA Farm Resource Region are represented in Table 3.1. Agricultural 
characteristics for each region are classified as the percentage of farms in each region; the 
percentage of production value; percentage of cropland; and the major agricultural products 
produced in each region (Table 3.2). The regions were created using county level data. Therefore, 
there is no clear-cut state boundary between each region. I select each state into a region 
depending on the physical area of the state occupied by the region (by visual inspection). My 
created Farm Resource Region with state boundaries is illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
21 
Table 3.1: Regions and their respective 
states 
Regions States 
Northern 
Crescent 
Minnesota 
Wisconsin 
Michigan 
Maine 
Pennsylvania 
New Jersey 
New York 
Connecticut 
Rhode Island 
Massachusetts 
Vermont 
New Hampshire 
Heartland 
Iowa 
Missouri 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Ohio 
Northern Great 
Plains 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Nebraska 
Regions States 
Southern 
Seaboard 
Alabama 
Georgia 
South Carolina 
Virginia 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Fruitful Rim 
Florida 
Arizona 
California 
Washington 
Idaho 
Mississippi Portal 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
Eastern Uplands 
Arkansas 
Tennessee 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 
Basin and Range 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Utah 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Montana 
Wyoming 
Prairie Gateway 
Texas 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
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Figure 3. 1. Map of Farm Resource Regions 
23 
Table 3.2. Regional agricultural characteristics 
Region 
% of 
farms 
% of prod 
value 
% of 
cropland 
Major ag. Products 
Basin and Range 4 4 4 Cattle, wheat, sorghum 
Fruitful Rim 10 22 8 Fruit, vegetables, nursery and cotton 
Northern Great Plains 5 6 17 Wheat, cattle, sheep 
Prairie Gateway 13 12 17 Cattle, wheat, sorghum, cotton, rice 
Heartland 22 23 27 Cash grain, cattle 
Mississippi Portal 5 4 5 Cotton, rice, poultry, Hog  
Northern Crescent 15 5 9 Diary, general crop, cash grain 
Eastern Uplands 15 5 6 Part-time cattle, tobacco, poultry 
Southern Seaboard 11 9 6 Part-time cattle, general field crop, 
poultry 
 
3.3. Data requirement and source 
The data covers the 48 contiguous states from 1960 to 2004, yielding 2,160 observations. 
The quantity of output for each crop and livestock subcategory includes off-farm commodities, 
inventory, and consumption from farm households. The data also includes the corresponding 
output price in each subcategory. There are four major input categories: labour, land, capital and 
intermediate inputs. Labour includes hours worked and hourly compensation. The land input is a 
measure of the stock of land at the county level which is constructed as the value of land divided 
by a price index. Capital inputs include a measure of capital stock and a corresponding rental 
price for each asset type. The perpetual inventory method is used to calculate capital stocks from 
investment data for assets that depreciate while implicit quantities are derived from accounting 
data for capital assets that are non-depreciating such as inventories (Ball, Butault, and Nehring, 
2001). Rental prices for each asset are based on the final price of the asset and the discounted 
value of projected future service flows.  
The estimate of environmental regulatory stringency level is based on the inputs which 
are considered as dirty (fertilizer, pesticide, energy (petroleum fuels, natural gas, and electricity)).  
Fertilizer and pesticide price indices were constructed from a hedonic regression result (Ball, 
Butault, and Nehring, 2001). In estimating the shadow price, I am not able to use aggregated 
price index for the dirty inputs (though I believe that is more appropriate) due to data constraints. 
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I include the dirty inputs as separate variables in the model. That notwithstanding, the estimated 
wedge is a single aggregated measure for all dirty inputs.  
I create total cost from the data as a product of the total input price and total quantity of 
input: 
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑝𝑣
𝑣
× ∑ 𝑄𝑣,
𝑣
 
where v is an index for inputs, p is price and Q is quantity. Table 3.3 indicates the variables used 
in the analysis, and their contents. The data and detailed information on how the variables were 
created can be found at https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-
us/methods/.     
 
Table 3.3: Variables and their sources 
Variable Description 
Output quantity Various crop and 
livestock species 
Capital input Includes depreciable 
and non-depreciable 
capital 
Land input Stock of land at the 
county level 
Labour input Includes hours 
worked and wage 
compensation 
 
Dirty inputs Includes fertilizers, 
pesticides, herbicides 
and energy use 
Other intermediate 
input 
Includes other farm 
inputs such as seeds 
and feed 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter explains the theoretical framework underlying the shadow price 
approach of estimating environmental regulatory stringency and explained the estimation process 
undertaken. This chapter presents and discusses estimation results from the generalized Leontief 
cost function. Here, I used time maps and graphs to show evidence of variation in environmental 
regulatory stringency across regions and over time. I also used the average price wedge as evidence 
of the variations in environmental regulatory stringency. The chapter also explains the policy 
implications of the results. 
 
4.2. Results from generalized Leontief model 
Regional parameter estimates from the cost function are presented in Table 4.1 (The full 
STATA output is presented in Appendix D). Though some studies found a positive coefficient 
for capital stock, in theory, given the presence of economies of scale, one expects that variable 
cost will decline if capital stock increases (Althammer and Hille, 2016; VLJ, 2006; Filippini, 
1996). This is confirmed by coefficient of the capital stock (𝛾𝐾𝐾), which is negative and 
significant at 0.05 level.  
The regional own-price effects of variable inputs, which are captured by 𝛼𝑟,𝑖𝑗, (𝑖 = 𝑗), all 
had the expected signs—all the coefficients for regional own-price effects are positive and 
significant—indicating that all else equal, variable cost increases when either prices of land (L), 
or labour (N), or any of the polluting inputs (F, PE, E, and A) increases. For instance, a dollar 
increase in price of fertilizer in the Basin and Range region will increase variable cost by $0.03 
holding all other factors fixed. The positive coefficients of the own-price effect validate the cost 
function approximation. Furthermore, calculating the second derivative of equation (3) suggests 
that the global convexity condition with respect to quasi-fixed input (capital) and the global 
concavity condition with respect to the prices of variable inputs (land, labour, fertilizer, pesticide, 
energy and agrochemicals) of the cost function are met. This computation is provided in 
Appendix A. Since the interaction effects are not restricted by theory, their coefficients are of less 
importance to the validation of the cost function approximation. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are also of less interest. However, their signs indicate the substitution possibility 
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between two variable inputs. For example, the coefficient  𝛼𝑃𝐴, which indicates the 
substitutability between pesticide and other agrochemicals, is negative, indicating that the two 
inputs can be substituted. A positive coefficient indicates that such substitution is likely not 
possible. 
The estimated wedge coefficient, 𝜆𝑟,𝑔, serves as an indicator for environmental regulatory 
stringency. The estimated price wedge is the sum of the wedge between the shadow price and 
market price of each dirty input. All the estimated wedges are positive and significant except for 
the coefficient for Mississippi Portal in the first period, which is positive but insignificant. The 
positive wedge in all regions over time hints at the possible long-time effort to mitigate pollution 
from agriculture. Government effort to control environmental degradation started back in the 
1930s after the dust bowl. The mission had been to protect the environment, mainly air, soil, and 
water. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1. Cost Function Parameter Estimates 
Regions Parameter Coefficient 
Common 
Coefficient 
                                                                                
𝛼𝐿𝑁 0.229*** (0.016) 
𝛼𝐿𝐹  0.010*** (0.003) 
𝛼𝐿𝑃  0.029*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝐿𝐸  0.002 (0.002) 
𝛼𝐿𝐴 0.044*** (0.004) 
𝛼𝑁𝐹  0.092*** (0.006) 
𝛼𝑁𝑃  0.063*** (0.003) 
𝛼𝑁𝐸  -0.004 (0.003) 
𝛼𝑁𝐴 0.158*** (0.007) 
𝛼𝐹𝑃  0.031*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐹𝐸  0.032*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝐹𝐴 -0.031*** (0.003) 
𝛼𝑃𝐴  -0.033*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑃𝐸  0.009*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐸𝐴 0.033*** (0.001) 
𝛾𝐾𝐾  -0.013** (0.005) 
𝛿𝐾𝐿  -0.663*** (0.129)                                                                                   
𝛿𝐾𝑁  4.172*** (0.157)                                                                                                
Regions Parameter Coefficient 
𝛿𝐾𝐹  -0.057*** (0.018)                                                                                              
𝛿𝐾𝑃  0.003 (0.011) 
𝛿𝐾𝐸  0.098*** (0.009)                                                                                          
𝛿𝐾𝐴  -0.053** (0.024)                                                                                                
 
Basin and 
Range (BR) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝐿𝐿  0.596*** (0.009) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝑁𝑁 0.612*** (0.01) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝐹𝐹  0.033*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝑃𝑃  0.016*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝐸𝐸  0.054*** (0.00) 
𝛼𝐵𝑅,𝐴𝐴 0.050*** (0.001) 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,65 0.552*** (0.055) 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,70 0.452*** (0.045) 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,73 0.470*** (0.046) 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,77 0.546*** (0.041)                                                                                               
𝜆𝐵𝑅,81 0.643*** (0.039)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐵𝑅,85 0.693*** (0.040)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,90 0.642*** (0.035)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐵𝑅,96 0.595*** (0.034)                                                                                                 
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Regions Parameter Coefficient 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,02 0.649*** (0.035) 
𝜆𝐵𝑅,04 0.642*** (0.043) 
   
Fruitful Rim 
(FR) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝐿𝐿  0.276*** (0.011) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝑁𝑁 0.647*** (0.014) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝐹𝐹  0.057*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝑃𝑃  0.029*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝐸𝐸  0.050*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐹𝑅,𝐴𝐴 0.086*** (0.002) 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,65 0.261*** (0.037) 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,70 0.252*** (0.032) 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,73 0.277*** (0.030) 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,77 0.329*** (0.029)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐹𝑅,81 0.383*** (0.029)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,85 0.459*** (0.035)                                                                                               
𝜆𝐹𝑅,90 0.358*** (0.031)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,96 0.365*** (0.032)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,02 0.411*** (0.033) 
𝜆𝐹𝑅,04 0.406*** (0.035) 
   
Northern 
Great Plains 
(NGP) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝐿𝐿  0.274*** (0.012) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝑁𝑁  0.519*** (0.015) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝐹𝐹  0.049*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝑃𝑃  0.025*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝐸𝐸  0.054*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑁𝐺𝑃,𝐴𝐴 0.075*** (0.002) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,65 0.422*** (0.039) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,70 0.377*** (0.035) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,73 0.368*** (0.034) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,77 0.504*** (0.031)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,81 0.536*** (0.029)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,85 0.568*** (0.030)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,90 0.477*** (0.027)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,96 0.439*** (0.027) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,02 0.434*** (0.028) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,04 0.474*** (0.031) 
   
Prairie 
Gateway 
(PG) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝐿𝐿  0.340*** (0.012) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝑁𝑁 0.606*** (0.015) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝐹𝐹  0.054*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝑃𝑃  0.019*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝐸𝐸  0.056*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐺𝑃,𝐴𝐴  0.073*** (0.002) 
Regions Parameter Coefficient 
𝜆𝐺𝑃,65 0.375*** (0.032) 
𝜆𝐺𝑃,70 0.374***(0.028) 
𝜆𝐺𝑃,73 0.424*** (0.028) 
𝜆𝐺𝑃,77 0.480*** (0.026)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐺𝑃,81 0.594*** (0.026)                                                                                               
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,85 0.667*** (0.029)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,90 0.608** (0.026)                                                                                                  
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,96 0.589*** (0.026) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,02 0.639*** (0.026) 
𝜆𝑁𝐺𝑃,04 0.629*** (0.030) 
   
Heartland 
(HL) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝐿𝐿  0.154*** (0.01) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝑁𝑁 0.495*** (0.012) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝐹𝐹  0.069*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝑃𝑃  0.025*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝐸𝐸  0.038*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐻𝐿,𝐴𝐴  0.094*** (0.002) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,65 0.413*** (0.035) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,70 0.368*** (0.031) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,73 0.350*** (0.030) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,77 0.445*** (0.030)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐻𝐿,81 0.385*** (0.030)                                                                                               
𝜆𝐻𝐿,85 0.356*** (0.035)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐻𝐿,90 0.275*** (0.028)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐻𝐿,96 0.247*** (0.030) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,02 0.316*** (0.031) 
𝜆𝐻𝐿,04 0.282*** (0.033) 
   
Mississippi 
Portal (MP) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝐿𝐿 0.205*** (0.015) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝑁𝑁 0.652*** (0.018) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝐹𝐹  0.065*** (0.002) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝑃𝑃  0.058*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝐸𝐸  0.053*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑀𝑃,𝐴𝐴  0.126*** (0.003) 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,65 0.030 (0.059) 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,70 0.200*** (0.052) 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,73 0.288*** (0.059)                                                                                               
𝜆𝑀𝑃,77 0.368*** (0.058)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑀𝑃,81 0.468*** (0.058)                                                                                               
𝜆𝑀𝑃,85 0.525*** (0.062)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,90 0.401*** (0.048)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑀𝑃,96 0.392*** (0.041) 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,02 0.421*** (0.038) 
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Regions Parameter Coefficient 
𝜆𝑀𝑃,04 0.348*** (0.048) 
   
Northern 
Crescent 
(NC) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝐿𝐿  0.108*** (0.006) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝑁𝑁  0.741*** (0.008) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝐹𝐹  0.038*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝑃𝑃  0.016*** (0.00) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝐸𝐸  0.038*** (0.00) 
𝛼𝑁𝐶,𝐴𝐴 0.054*** (0.001) 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,65 0.392*** (0.034) 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,70 0.382*** (0.030) 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,73 0.373*** (0.028)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,77 0.496*** (0.028)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑁𝐶,81 0.418*** (0.027)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑁𝐶,85 0.427*** (0.030)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑁𝐶,90 0.353*** (0.027)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,96 0.344*** (0.030) 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,02 0.350*** (0.032) 
𝜆𝑁𝐶,04 0.315*** (0.034) 
   
Eastern 
Uplands (EU) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝐿𝐿  0.204*** (0.011) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝑁  0.809*** (0.013) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝐹𝐹  0.053*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝑃𝑃  0.021*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝐸𝐸  0.041*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝐸𝑈,𝐴𝐴  0.073*** (0.002) 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,65 0.282*** (0.045) 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,70 0.334*** (0.042) 
Regions Parameter Coefficient 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,73 0.364*** (0.044)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐸𝑈,77 0.445*** (0.040)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,81 0.425*** (0.038)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐸𝑈,85 0.385*** (0.040)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐸𝑈,90 0.353*** (0.034)                                                                                                
𝜆𝐸𝑈,96 0.372*** (0.032) 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,02 0.415*** (0.031) 
𝜆𝐸𝑈,04 0.411*** (0.036) 
 
 
Southern 
Seaboard
(SS) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝐿𝐿  0.179*** (0.008) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝑁𝑁 0.616*** (0.01) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹  0.072*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝑃𝑃  0.023*** (0.001) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸  0.044*** (0.00) 
𝛼𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴  0.093*** (0.001) 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,65 0.311*** (0.041) 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,70 0.324*** (0.034) 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,73 0.338*** (0.036)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑆𝑆,77 0.399*** (0.033)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,81 0.426*** (0.034)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑆𝑆,85 0.389*** (0.035)                                                                                                 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,90 0.347*** (0.033)                                                                                                
𝜆𝑆𝑆,96 0.329*** (0.031) 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,02 0.429*** (0.033) 
𝜆𝑆𝑆,04 0.413*** (0.036) 
(Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
 
4.3. Regional variation in stringency 
From the estimated wedges, I create maps showing the variation across states for each 
time period (Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.10). These maps indicate the considerable variation in 
stringency across states at different periods. Each colour gradient change represents a stringency 
difference of not more than 20%, with the darkest green gradient indicating the highest 
stringency. The first two periods (1960-65 and 1965-70) share similar stringency characteristics 
of states over the two periods. States in the Basin and Range (BR) region are the most stringent 
during these two periods (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). This is followed by states in the Heartland, 
Northern Great Plains (NGP), Prairie Gateway and the Northern Crescent regions. States located 
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within the Mississippi Portal (MP) exhibit the least stringency during these periods, and states 
within the Southern Seaboards and Fruitful Rim (FR) are moderately stringent. 
When considering environmental stringency through all time periods the Basin and Range 
region dominates, with the Prairie Gateway and the Northern Great Plains ranking second or third 
in order of stringency in most time periods. States located within the Heartland (HL) region (i.e., 
the Corn Belt) exhibit the least stringency in most time periods—from 1977-81 to 2002-2004. 
This is evident in Figure 4.11 which shows average environmental regulatory stringency over 
time.  Starting from the 1977-1981 period to the last period covered under the study, states in the 
Heartland region are the least stringent. This coincides with the passage of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act in 1980. Over time, corn production acreage has risen significantly  (USDA-ERS, 
2017). The majority of corn acreage is located within the Heartland, and about 90% of corn 
acreage is insured (Shields, 2017). Therefore, if crop insurance is to reduce the cost of production 
in any way, it is likely to indirectly reduce the relative price of polluting inputs and subsequently 
reduce regulation stringency. Also, due to the relative intensity and coverage of production on 
corn acreage and the importance of corn production to the nation’s economy, states within the 
Heartland are likely to adopt other incentivised environmental management practices that are 
likely to indirectly reduce the cost of polluting inputs (Kara, Ribaudo, and Johansson, 2008). For 
instance, engaging in cost-share program like the Environmental Quality Improvement Program 
directly reduce the cost that should be incurred for installing environmental improvement 
technologies. If enrollment in this program increases over time, then it is likely to affect 
environmental stringency as well. 
 From the estimated wedges I compute an average price wedge across time. This is 
reported along with the percentage of farms in each region and the ratio of price wedge to 
regional average fertilizer price (Table 4.2).  The ratio gives a fair idea of the magnitude of the 
price wedge relative to fertilizer price. The minimum and maximum values and standard 
deviations indicate considerable variation in stringency over time. The average wedges provide 
further evidence indicating that the Heartland is the least stringent region, followed by the 
Mississippi Portal and Fruitful Rim. The Basin and Range and the Prairie Gateway regions are 
also confirmed by the averages as the most stringent regions, followed by the Northern Great 
Plains and the Northern Crescent regions. The Eastern Uplands and the Southern Seaboard are 
moderately stringent. 
 Comparing the average price wedge to the price of fertilizer for each region, the Prairie 
Gateway boasts the highest wedge to fertilizer price ratio (99.83%). Thus, the average price of 
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fertilizer in the Prairie Gateway is approximately the same as the average wedge in that region. 
The average price of fertilizer in the Basin and Range and Northern Great Plain regions are 
approximately four-fifths of their average price wedges. The region with the least average wedge-
to-average fertilizer price is the Fruitful Rim with a ratio of 41%. The Northern Crescent, Eastern 
Uplands and the Southern Seaboard have approximately 60% average price wedge to average 
regional fertilizer price ratio. The average price of fertilizer in the Heartland and Mississippi 
Regions are about half their average price wedge. The comparison between the price wedge and 
the price of polluting inputs could be more complete by using the aggregated price index for all 
dirty inputs. This is not possible since it was not possible to create such an aggregate due to the 
nature of available data. Considering that NPS pollutants from agriculture are mainly nitrogen 
and phosphorus deposition (Dowd et al., 2008), I choose to compare the price wedge with 
average price of fertilizer. 
An important observation from this analysis is that the region with the smallest 
percentage of total U.S. farms (Basin and Range; 4%) is the most stringent region and the region 
with the highest percentage of farms (Heartland; 22%) is the least stringent region (Table 4.2). 
With a correlation coefficient of -0.42, regions with greater percentage of farms are likely to have 
lesser stringency. Notable outliers are the Prairie Gateway and the Mississippi Portal. The Prairie 
Gateway possesses 13% of farms but is the second highest in ranking according to the mean price 
wedge, whereas the Mississippi Portal possesses 5% of farms but ranked second to last. 
However, I also observe that these two regions have the highest standard deviations of the 
average wedges.  The vast deviation is likely to account for their deviation from the identified 
pattern. This result however, needs to be accepted with caution because the problem that 
characterize the use of aggregate data. Inferences for state-level base on the regional-level 
analysis could be misleading. 
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Figure 4.1. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1960-65 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1965-70 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1970-73 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1973-77 
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Figure 4.5. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1977-81 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1981-85 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1985-90 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1990-1996 
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Figure 4.9. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 1996-2002 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Environmental regulatory 
stringency 2002-2004 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Average environmental 
regulatory stringency over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend
Average
0.343700 - 0.344100
0.344101 - 0.350100
0.350101 - 0.385000
0.385001 - 0.459900
0.459901 - 0.588400
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4.4. Regional-level temporal variation in stringency 
Over the time periods evaluated in this study all regions demonstrate a general increase in 
stringency with the notable exception of the Heartland and Northern Crescent regions where the 
highest value cash crops are grown (Figure 4.12 and Figures 4.12.i to 4.12.ix). This is illustrated 
by the slope of the trend line (dashed) for each region in Figure 4.12.i – Figure 4.12.ix. 
Specifically, from the 1960-65 to the 1981-85 period, the Mississippi Portal (MP) demonstrated a 
sharp rise in environmental stringency followed by a decline until the last period. The Basin and 
Range region, which has the highest stringency in all periods, recorded a sharp decline in 
stringency from the 1960-65 period to the 1965-70 period, after which there was a rise in 
stringency until the 1981-85 period. The slope of the trend line of Prairie Gateway (Figure 
4.12.ii) indicates that the Prairie Gateway has the highest rate of rise in stringency. In contrast, 
the Northern Crescent and Heartland regions show decline in stringency over time (Figure 4.12.iv 
and Figure 4.12.ix). Their highest stringencies were recorded during the 1973-77 period. Even 
though there was a general decline in stringency, the regions also experienced rises in stringency 
between the 1970-73 and the 1973-77 periods, times when most regions were also experiencing a 
rise in stringency. Interestingly, these two regions have cash grains as some of their major crops, 
particularly corn and soybean, which are very important to the economies of the regions and 
heavily covered by crop insurance.  
  With respect to the temporal environmental regulatory stringency of states in the 
Heartland (Corn Belt) region, the results showed that all states in the region, except for Missouri, 
demonstrated declining stringency over time (Figure 4.13). Illinois was the least stringent. The 
decline in stringency demonstrated by the four states (Illinois, Iowa, Indian, and Ohio) is likely to 
be driving the decline in stringency in the Corn Belt region. This state-level analysis confirms the 
skepticism about state-level inferences based on regional-level analysis. Albeit using regional-
level conclusion suggest that Missouri also shows decline in regulatory stringency, state-level 
analysis suggest the otherwise. 
The Eastern Upland and Southern Seaboard regions (Figure 4.12.v and Figure 4.12.vi) are 
the only two that showed a slight rise in stringency yet do not show rise between 1977-81 and 
1981-85. These two regions follow almost the same trend, with the same rate of stringency rise 
and the same intercept. They also showed relatively stable stringency over time. These two 
regions also have the same percentage of cropland – 6 percent. The Northern Great Plains and the 
Fruitful Rim (Figure 4.12.iii and Figure 4.12.vii) also maintained a steady stringency over time 
with notable rise from 1960 to 1985.  
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In general, there is a rise in stringency from the 1970-73 period to the 1981-85 period 
when most regions reached the peak of stringency. This period of increasing stringency coincides 
with the introduction of the Clean Water Act in 1972. Even though the CWA does not directly 
place any restriction on agriculture, the National Ambient Water Quality standards could be 
forcing states to implement stricter regulations in all sectors to improve water quality, especially 
for states with poorer water quality. 
Three important observations can be made from the research findings. First, there is a 
high degree of variation in environmental stringency within each region. Second, there is 
empirical evidence to support increasing efforts by states to control agricultural water pollution. 
This is demonstrated by the general rise in stringency over time (Fig B.1). However, the 
Heartland and Northern Crescent regions, comprising 22% and 15% of farms in the U.S., 
demonstrate a decline in stringency (slopes of trend lines are respectively -0.0157 and -0.009). 
This highlights the difficulty in controlling nonpoint pollution from agriculture, especially in 
areas where agriculture is an important component of the regional economy. Finally, that all 
regions follow a similar trend with slight differences in slope could indicate the impact of federal 
policy perturbed by variations in state-level enforcement. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. i. Basin and Range 
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Figure 4.12. ii. Prairie Gateway 
 
 
Figure 4.12. iii. Northern Great Plains 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. iv. Northern Crescent 
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Figure 4.12. v. Eastern Uplands 
 
 
Figure 4.12. vi. Southern Seaboard 
 
Figure 4.12. vii. Fruitful Rim 
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Figure 4.12. viii. Mississippi Portal 
 
 
Figure 4.12. ix. Heartland 
 
 
Figure 4. 12: Environmental regulatory stringency of states in the corn belt region
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 Table 4. 2. Average Price wedge, Percentage of U.S. Farms in Region, and wedge-
fertilizer price ratio 
 
4.5. Policy implications 
Though the primary aim of this study is to determine how environmental regulatory 
stringency of the agricultural sector varies across U.S. states and over time, it also has important 
implications for policy. The study shows that there is variation in environmental regulatory 
stringency across regions. This implies that federal incentives to mitigate water pollution from 
agriculture will have different effects in different states. The repercussion of this is the potential 
relocation of farms that use more polluting inputs (such as the production of corn) from highly-
regulated regions (for example, Basin and Range) to less-regulated regions (for example, Corn 
Belt) leading to further water quality deterioration in the regions with the least stringent 
regulations. This phenomenon is perhaps already occurring–a recent EPA assessment reports that 
46% of U.S. rivers and streams are in poor biological condition, 25% are in fair condition, and 
28% are good condition, with the Plains and Lowlands and the Eastern highlands possessing 
about 50% poor-condition rivers (EPA, 2016). 
However, it is also worth noting that since agriculture production is dependent on climatic 
and soil factors, relocation of firms from one region to another may come with change in crop 
type and huge transaction cost which could deter farmers from relocating. That is, the notion of a 
pollution haven is a more restricted concept in agriculture than other sectors. Accordingly, further 
deterioration in water quality in less stringent regions could be attributed to the lobbying power 
Region Avg. wedge (S.D) Min. Max. % of US 
Farms in 
Region 
Ratio of 
wedge to 
fert. Price 
Basin and Range (BR) 0.5884 (0.0811) 0.4520 0.6930 4 84.18% 
Prairie Gateway (PG) 0.5379 (0.1133) 0.3740 0.6670 13 99.83% 
Northern Great Plains (NGP) 0.4599 (0.0648) 0.3680 0.5680 5 80.68% 
Northern Crescent (NC) 0.3850 (0.0519) 0.3150 0.4960 15 58.07% 
Eastern Upland (EU) 0.3786 (0.0485) 0.2820 0.4450 15 59.23% 
Southern Seaboard (SS) 0.3705 (0.0453) 0.3110 0.4290 11 56.03% 
Fruitful Rim (FR) 0.3501 (0.0695) 0.2520 0.4590 10 41.02% 
Mississippi Portal (MP) 0.3441 (0.1425) 0.0300 0.5250 5 49.53% 
Heartland (HL) 0.3437 (0.0634) 0.2470 0.4450 22 53.39% 
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of agricultural groups in these regions. Considering that corn is a very important crop to the U.S. 
economy and the less stringent regions dominate in the production of this crop, they are likely to 
have strong lobbying power either by being exempted from certain regulations or have them 
being less restrictive (lax).  
Going forward, programs that influence water quality in the Farm Bill should be 
restructured to effectively achieve a standard water quality goal. These programs are limited in 
that they have multiple goals, and are usually disbursed as payments to farmers, which means 
that conservation practices largely depends on government spending (Shortle, 2017).  
Addressing this in the next Farm Bill will require stricter monitoring of federal policies in 
regions with lax regulatory stringency. For instance, most high value croplands are clustered 
around important watershed and most of these croplands are located within the Heartland region 
(the region with the least and declining environmental regulatory stringency). Stricter monitoring 
of Federal policies in this region will be required to realize the full impact of policies within the 
region. 
Programs in the Farm Bill that influence water quality should be made more specific to 
address water pollution rather than making them solve many problems at the same time. Most of 
these programs simultaneously attempt to increase producer revenue, share cost with producers, 
and protect the environment. In such cases, polluters tend to focus on the benefit they get from 
the program more than the environmental protection role of the program. For example, the CRP 
compensates land owners to take environmentally-sensitive land out of production. This provides 
revenue for the land owner as well as serving the purpose of environmental protection. That CRP 
enrollment increases in low price periods and decreases in high price periods indicates farmers 
interest in revenue over environmental protection (Morefield et al., 2016), which is expected. 
This could be made more effective and efficient by restricting production on such lands and 
compensating land owners only if they have improved the environmental state of the land. With 
this, the government would be paying for the outcome of the environmental activity, not the 
activity itself. 
With the challenges that characterize NPS pollutants—measurement difficulties and not 
under the control of farmers—it will be difficult to adopt a performance-based approach to 
improve water quality. Alternatively, the activity-based approach could be altered to improve 
performance. This can be achieved by (i) binding instruments to measurable environmental 
changes, and (ii) improving the policy instrument design through targeting of specific locations 
and watersheds (Shortle et al., 2012).  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. Limitations  
Deriving the average shadow price of aggregated polluting inputs will provide a better 
idea of the magnitude of environmental stringency. However, this is hindered by the fact that it 
was not possible to create an aggregated price index comprised solely of dirty inputs, because the 
data is available only in indexed form. The available aggregated price index comprised of all 
dirty inputs and contains other inputs such as seed and feed. Unfortunately, these inputs (seed and 
feed) represent majority of the index and hence I could not use it as a proxy for “dirty inputs”.  
Another limitation to this study has to do with the creation of the regions. The USDA 
used county-level data to create the Farm Resource Regions, which resulted in some states 
appearing in more than one region. I selected states into regions based on the land area in the 
map. Therefore, the estimated regional wedges will be influenced by which states are included in 
each region. 
Another important limitation is the necessity of the maintained hypothesis of functional 
form when using the shadow price approach. White (1980) demonstrates the misspecification 
bias when second-order Taylor series expansions are used to approximate unknown functions 
using least squares as done in this thesis. The Box-Cox functional form is able to correct this 
bias. This was not possible in my analysis due to the inclusion of dummies to capture the wedge. 
The Box-Cox functional form did not allow for dummy variable inclusion.  
 
5.2. Summary 
The nonpoint source nature of agricultural water pollution poses severe challenges to 
regulatory authorities seeking to mitigate water pollution. The efforts of the Federal government 
to control water pollution are mostly implemented at the state-level. Additionally, some states 
voluntarily implement measures to control water pollution from agriculture. The in-state 
application and enforcement of environmental regulations is likely to result in varying 
environmental regulation stringency across states. This variation is captured in earlier studies 
using aggregated government efforts to control environmental damages. However, this approach 
is not only theoretically inconsistent but also ambiguous. The variation in state-level stringency is 
likely to influence the impact of Federal policies on water quality, hence the need to create a 
theoretically consistent measure of environmental regulatory stringency in the agricultural sector.  
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Using the shadow price approach overcomes the challenges of measuring environmental 
stringency and reflects the fact that implicit costs are placed on polluting inputs by regulations. 
The method adopted in this study is built on a competitive firm’s input decision under cost 
minimization. The method is built on the assumption that the equilibrium that exists between 
private marginal benefit and marginal cost is disrupted by environmental regulations. Using the 
generalized Leontief cost function and adopting the approach of VLJ (2006) and state-level 
production price data, I make the first attempt to apply the shadow price approach to measure 
regulatory stringency in the U.S. agricultural sector. I estimate regional wedges, which indicate 
stringency, using a price index for dirty inputs in agriculture. I capture the wedges through 
grouped time intervals according to various Farm Bill periods, from 1960 through 2004 as a 
proxy for environmental stringency. 
The estimates show considerable variation in environmental regulatory stringency across 
Farm Resource Regions and variation over time. Generally, stringency in all regions followed the 
same trend. Estimated average wedges show that regions with the smallest percentage of farms in 
the U.S. have the highest level of average stringency, whereas the region with the highest 
percentage of farms possess the least average stringency. This is a potentially troubling finding 
given that much of the high-value cropland in the U.S. is clustered around major watersheds that 
provide essential services for a large portion of the U.S. population.  
The implication of the variability in environmental regulatory stringency is that federal 
incentives to address water pollution from agriculture will have different effects in different 
states. This could result in potential relocation of high polluting farms from very stringent regions 
to less stringent regions, which could further deteriorate water quality in these regions (less 
stringent regions). Programs in the Farm Bill that address environmental pollution (water 
pollution) will require restructuring to be consistent with the “polluter pays” principle instead of 
paying the polluter. It will also require payments, where necessary, to be made for the outcome of 
an environmental action rather than paying for the environmental action. Since it is difficult to 
employ a performance-based approach to control NPS pollution from agriculture, using an 
improved activity-based approach that encourages the blend of both approaches, in my opinion, 
will yield a better outcome than any single approach. Also, stricter monitoring of Federal policies 
will be required in regions with lax regulatory stringency for these policies to achieve the set 
goals in these regions. 
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5.3. Areas for future research 
There are several studies that assess the impact of individual government programs on water 
quality. Since the shadow price approach is able to capture several policy and program effects into 
a single index, it will be very insightful to look at how water quality indices vary with state-level 
stringency of implemented regulations, especially at highly polluted watershed areas. This can be 
achieved by selecting states that are close to the watershed and estimating their environmental 
regulatory stringency. The estimates can then be used with other control variables as regressors on 
water quality indices. 
Institutions play a vital role in policy and regulation implementation and enforcement. For 
instance, regulations could be stringent enough to achieve a set goal. However, if the institution 
to implement these regulations is corrupt, the full impact of regulations might not be realized. 
Understanding how institutional qualities such as corruption and political stability among other 
indices impact environmental regulation stringency is another research area which could be 
investigated in the future.     
My research only provides an aggregated measure of stringency of all implemented 
environmental regulations and policies. A future research that looks at what the individual 
impacts of crop insurance and policies in the Farm Bill on environmental stringency are could 
also provide important information to policy makers on specific environmental policies.  
Given that previous measures of regulatory stringency in U.S. agricultural sector were 
based on government effort indices, and these results were used to test the pollution haven 
hypothesis (as in (USDA, 2000)), it will be prudent to test these hypotheses once again using the 
shadow price approach estimates to verify if there will be a change in conclusion.  
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Table A. 1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Variable description Mean Std dev Min Max 
y Total output qnty 3845798 3937507 42855.61 3.16E+07 
L Land qnty 714651.8 758782.8 4014.592 5155293 
N Labour qnty 1971849 1742061 18189.34 9476398 
F Fertilizer qnty 208046.2 226377.5 1301.193 1637918 
PE Pesticide qnty 97879.22 125812.4 194.3583 964614.2 
E Energy qnty 163913 151570.7 1497.354 860383 
A Agrochemical qnty 306009.4 336847.1 1708.779 2086151 
Pl Land price 0.606616 0.575486 0.006121 3.631588 
K Capital qnty 662047 591411.5 7350.917 3330621 
Pn Labour price 0.439535 0.334196 0.048593 2.110528 
Pf Fertilizer price 0.671578 0.318431 0.068969 1.865223 
Pp Pesticide price 0.76164 0.336915 0.113744 2.533966 
Pe Energy price 0.789549 0.41604 0.176648 1.865717 
Pa Agrochemical price 0.684411 0.303011 0.080656 1.558945 
t Time trend 23 12.99018 1 45 
 
Computing global concavity in variable input prices and convexity in quasi-fixed input 
Using the variable description in Table A.1 and assuming that land, labour, fertilizer, pesticide, 
energy, and agrochemical are variable inputs, and capital is the only quasi-fixed input, whereas 
time trend proxy for technological changes, the generalized Leontief cost function then appears 
as; 
 
𝐶 = 𝑦[𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑙 + 𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑛 + 𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑍𝑓 + 𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑝 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑍𝑒 + 𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑍𝑎 + 𝛼𝑛𝑙𝑃𝑛
0.5𝑃𝑙
0.5 + 𝛼𝑛𝑓𝑃𝑛
0.5𝑍𝑓
0.5
+ 𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑃𝑛
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5 + 𝛼𝑛𝑒𝑃𝑛
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5 + + 𝛼𝑛𝑎𝑃𝑛
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5 + 𝛼𝑙𝑓𝑃𝑙
0.5𝑍𝑓
0.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑝𝑃𝑙
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5
+ 𝛼𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑙
0.5𝑍𝑒
0.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑎𝑃𝑙
0.5𝑍𝑎
0.5 +  𝛼𝑓𝑝𝑍𝑓
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5  +  𝛼𝑓𝑒𝑍𝑓
0.5𝑍𝑒
0.5 + 𝛼𝑓𝑎𝑍𝑓
0.5𝑍𝑎
0.5  
+  𝛼𝑝𝑒𝑍𝑒
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5  +  𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑍𝑎
0.5𝑍𝑝
0.5  +  𝛼𝑒𝑎𝑍𝑒
0.5𝑍𝑎
0.5] + 
𝑦[𝛿𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑛𝑡
0.5 +  𝛿𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
0.5 + 𝛿𝑓𝑡𝑍𝑓𝑡
0.5 + 𝛿𝑝𝑡𝑍𝑝𝑡
0.5 + 𝛿𝑒𝑡𝑍𝑒𝑡
0.5 +  𝛿𝑎𝑡𝑍𝑎𝑡
0.5 + 𝛾𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑡
+  𝛾𝑓𝑡𝑍𝑓𝑡 +  𝛾𝑝𝑡𝑍𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝑒𝑡𝑍𝑒𝑡 +  𝛾𝑎𝑡𝑍𝑎𝑡] + 
(1) 
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𝑦0.5 [𝛿𝑙𝑘𝑃𝑙𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝛿𝑛𝑘𝑃𝑛𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝛿𝑓𝑘𝑍𝑓𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝛿𝑝𝑘𝑍𝑝𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝛿𝑒𝑘𝑍𝑒𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝛿𝑎𝑘𝑍𝑎𝑋𝑘
0.5 + 𝑃𝑛𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5
+ 𝑃𝑙𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5 + 𝑍𝑓𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5  + 𝑍𝑝𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5  + 𝑍𝑒𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5  + 𝑍𝑎𝛾𝑡𝑘𝑡
.5𝑋 .5]
+ 𝛾𝑛𝑘𝑃𝑛𝑋𝑘 + 𝛾𝑙𝑘𝑃𝑙𝑋𝑘 + 𝛾𝑓𝑘𝑍𝑓𝑋𝑘 + 𝛾𝑝𝑘𝑍𝑝𝑋𝑘  + 𝛾𝑒𝑘𝑍𝑒𝑋𝑘 + 𝛾𝑎𝑘𝑍𝑎𝑋𝑘 
 
For concavity in variable input prices, 
 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2 
< 0 
 
(2) 
 
And convexity in quasi-fixed input is given as, 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑋𝑘
2 > 0 
 
(3) 
From equation (3), the second derivative of the cost function with respect to the variable 
inputs’ price can be written as 
 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑝𝑖
2 
= −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑖
−1.5  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑗
.5
(𝑚−1)
𝑗
 
 
(4) 
Land 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑙
2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑙
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑙𝑝𝑛
.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑓
.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝
.5 + 𝛼𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑒
.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑎
.5) (5) 
 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑙
2 
= (−961447.25)(2.1166)(0.2235) =  −454822.3322 < 0 
Labour 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑛2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑛
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑙𝑝𝑙
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑓
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝
.5 + 𝛼𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑒
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑎
.5) (6) 
 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑛2 
= (−961447.25)(1.9554)(0.4215) =  −792372.3006 < 0 
Fertilizer 
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 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑛2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑛
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑙𝑝𝑙
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑓𝑝𝑓
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝
.5 + 𝛼𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑒
.5 +  𝛼𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑎
.5) 
 
(7) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑓
2 
= (−961447.25)(1.8169)(0.0986) =  −172239.7559 < 0 
Pesticide 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑝2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑝
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛
.5 +  𝛼𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓
.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙
.5 +  𝛼𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑒
.5 +  𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑎
.5) 
 
(8) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑝2 
= (−961447.25)(1.5046)(0.0704) =  −101909.6212 < 0 
Energy 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑒2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑒
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑛
.5 + 𝛼𝑙𝑒𝑝𝑙
.5 +  𝛼𝑓𝑒𝑝𝑓
.5 +  𝛼𝑝𝑒𝑝𝑝
.5 +  𝛼𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑎
.5) 
 
(9) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑒2 
= (−961447.25)(1.4255)(0.0603) =  −82623.4622 < 0 
Agrochemical 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑎2 
=  −0.25𝑦 ∗ 𝑝𝑎
−1.5 (𝛼𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑛
.5 +  𝛼𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑙
.5 +  𝛼𝑓𝑎𝑝𝑓
.5 + 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑝
.5 +  𝛼𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑒
.5) 
 
(10) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝑎2 
= (−961447.25)(1.76621)(0.1141) =  −193792.0058 < 0 
 
For convexity, the second derivative of the cost function with respect to the quasi-fixed input is 
derived as; 
 𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑋𝑘
2 =  −0.25𝑦
.5 ∗ 𝑋𝑘
−1.5[(𝛿𝑛𝑘𝑝𝑛 +  𝛿𝑙𝑘𝑝𝑙 +  𝛿𝑓𝑘𝑝𝑓 +  𝛿𝑝𝑘𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝑒𝑘𝑝𝑒 +
 𝛿𝑎𝑘𝑝𝑎) + 𝑡
.5(𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑛 + 𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑙 +  𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑓 +  𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑒 +  𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑎)] 
 
(11) 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑋𝑘
2 = [(−9.1 × 10
−7) × (1.4341) × (−0.0489)] = 6.3115 × 10−8 > 0 
 
55 
Correlation Coefficient between Regional Average Price Wedges and the Percentage of 
Farms in Each Region 
Table A. 2. Correlation Coefficient Calculation 
Region Av. Wedge (W) % of 
Farm(P) 
 
W-w = A 
 
P-p = B 
 
A*B 
 
𝐵2 
 
𝐴2  
BR 0.5884 4 0.1708 -7.1111 -1.2147 50.5679 0.0292 
PR 0.5379 13 0.1203 1.8889 0.2273 3.5679 0.0145 
NGP 0.4599 5 0.0423 -6.1111 -0.2586 37.3457 0.0018 
NC 0.385 15 -0.0326 3.8889 -0.1267 15.1235 0.0011 
EU 0.3786 15 -0.0390 3.8889 -0.1516 15.1235 0.0015 
SS 0.3705 11 -0.0471 -0.1111 0.0052 0.0123 0.0022 
FR 0.3501 10 -0.0675 -1.1111 0.0750 1.2346 0.0046 
MP 0.3441 5 -0.0735 -6.1111 0.4490 37.3457 0.0054 
HL 0.3437 22 -0.0739 10.8889 -0.8044 118.5679 0.0055 
 
∑
𝑊
𝑛
= 𝑤
 
𝑛
𝑖
 
=0.4176 
∑
𝑃
𝑛
= 𝑝 
𝑛
𝑖
 
=11.1111 
  
∑(𝐴 ∗ 𝐵)
𝑛
𝑖
=  
 
-1.7996  
∑(𝐵2) =
𝑛
𝑖
 
278.8889 
∑(𝐴2)  
𝑛
𝑖
 
=0.0657 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑟) =
∑ (𝐴 ∗ 𝐵)𝑛𝑖
√(∑ (𝐴2)𝑛𝑖 )(∑ (𝐵
2)𝑛𝑖 )
 
𝑟 =  −
1.7996
√(278.8889)(0.0657)
 
𝑟 =  −
1.7998
4.2805
=  −0.42
56 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
Figure B. 1. Environmental regulatory stringency: All regions 
 
 
Table B. 1. State-level wedges for states in the Heartland region 
States  Parameter Wedge (s.e) 
Iowa 𝜆𝐼𝐴,65 0.319*** (0.076) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,70 0.366*** (0.075) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,73 0.367*** (0.072) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,77 0.453*** (0.073) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,81 0.352***(0.073) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,85 0.315*** (0.078) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,90 0.217*** (0.07) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,96 0.215*** (0.075) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,02 0.209*** (0.076) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐴,04 0.174** (0.074) 
   
Illinois 𝜆𝐼𝐿,65 0.361*** (0.086) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,70 0.336*** (0.08) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,73 0.307*** (0.077) 
0
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 𝜆𝐼𝐿,77 0.267*** (0.082) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,81 0.205** (0.084) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,85 0.167* (0.091) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,90 0.096 (0.08) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,96 0.097 (0.082) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,02 0.104 (0.086) 
 𝜆𝐼𝐿,04 0.081 (0.085) 
   
Indiana 𝜆𝐼𝑁,65 0.413*** (0.125) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,70 0.420*** (0.112) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,73 0.380*** (0.106) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,77 0.434*** (0.104) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,81 0.288*** (0.097) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,85 0.214** (0.101) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,90 0.199** (0.098) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,96 0.232** (0.101) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,02 0.221** (0.104) 
 𝜆𝐼𝑁,04 0.202* (0.106) 
   
Missouri  𝜆𝑀𝑂,65 0.299*** (0.115) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,70 0.368*** (0.11) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,73 0.397***(0.105) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,77 0.545*** (0.108) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,81 0.470*** (0.101) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,85 0.424*** (0.102) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,90 0.392*** (0.01) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,96 0.487*** (102) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,02 0.532*** (0.097) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,04 0.544*** (0.097) 
 𝜆𝑀𝑂,65 0.431*** (0.125) 
   
Ohio 𝜆𝑂𝐻,70 0.407*** (0.115) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,73 0.413*** (0.108) 
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 𝜆𝑂𝐻,77 0.401*** (0.106) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,81 0.268*** (0.095) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,85 0.239** (0.099) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,90 0.205** (0.093) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,96 0.245** (0.097) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,02 0.304*** (0.099) 
 𝜆𝑂𝐻,04 0.297*** (0.104) 
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Figure C.  1. Farm Resource Regions 
Source: (USDA, 2000)
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STATA OUTPUT 
Seemingly unrelated regression, iterated  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation             Obs   Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"     F-Stat        P 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TC                 2,160     141    337334.8    0.9913    1968.71   0.0000 
L_Q                2,160      18    .1396943    0.7082     298.01   0.0000 
N_Q                2,160      18    .1735908    0.8008     553.71   0.0000 
F_Q                2,160      18    .0185907    0.5242     276.42   0.0000 
E_Q                2,160      18    .0078695    0.6614     268.12   0.0000 
PE_Q               2,160      18    .0096337    0.6342     350.10   0.0000 
A_Q                2,160      18    .0249344    0.4860     174.33   0.0000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 ( 1)  - [L_Q]sqrPnDsqrPl_d5 + [N_Q]sqrPlDsqrPn_d5 = 0 
 ( 2)  [N_Q]sqrPfDsqrPn_d5 - [F_Q]sqrPnDsqrPf_d5 = 0 
 ( 3)  [N_Q]sqrPpDsqrPn_d5 - [PE_Q]sqrPnDsqrPp_d5 = 0 
 ( 4)  [N_Q]sqrPaDsqrPn_d5 - [A_Q]sqrPnDsqrPa_d5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [N_Q]sqrPeDsqrPn_d5 - [E_Q]sqrPnDsqrPe_d5 = 0 
 ( 6)  [L_Q]sqrPfDsqrPl_d5 - [F_Q]sqrPlDsqrPf_d5 = 0 
 ( 7)  [L_Q]sqrPpDsqrPl_d5 - [PE_Q]sqrPlDsqrPp_d5 = 0 
 ( 8)  [L_Q]sqrPeDsqrPl_d5 - [E_Q]sqrPlDsqrPe_d5 = 0 
 ( 9)  [L_Q]sqrPaDsqrPl_d5 - [A_Q]sqrPlDsqrPa_d5 = 0 
 (10)  [F_Q]sqrPpDsqrPf_d5 - [PE_Q]sqrPfDsqrPp_d5 = 0 
 (11)  [F_Q]sqrPeDsqrPf_d5 - [E_Q]sqrPfDsqrPe_d5 = 0 
 (12)  [F_Q]sqrPaDsqrPf_d5 - [A_Q]sqrPfDsqrPa_d5 = 0 
 (13)  [PE_Q]sqrPaDsqrPp_d5 - [A_Q]sqrPpDsqrPa_d5 = 0 
 (14)  - [E_Q]sqrPpDsqrPe_d5 + [PE_Q]sqrPeDsqrPp_d5 = 0 
 (15)  - [E_Q]sqrPaDsqrPe_d5 + [A_Q]sqrPeDsqrPa_d5 = 0 
 (16)  [L_Q]K_Q - [N_Q]K_Q = 0 
 (17)  [N_Q]K_Q - [F_Q]K_Q = 0 
 (18)  [F_Q]K_Q - [A_Q]K_Q = 0 
 (19)  - [E_Q]K_Q + [A_Q]K_Q = 0 
 (20)  [E_Q]K_Q - [PE_Q]K_Q = 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TC               | 
        c.Q#c.Pn |  -2.941304   1.216773    -2.42   0.016     -5.32633   -.5562772 
                 | 
        c.Q#c.Pl |  -.2369349   .7054747    -0.34   0.737    -1.619753    1.145883 
                 | 
        c.Q#c.Pf |   7.205276   5.457952     1.32   0.187    -3.492984    17.90354 
                 | 
        c.Q#c.Pp |   1.898301   2.703431     0.70   0.483    -3.400759    7.197361 
                 | 
        c.Q#c.Pe |  -2.825084   .9013013    -3.13   0.002    -4.591746   -1.058422 
                 | 
        c.Q#c.Pa |   7.646434   8.581293     0.89   0.373     -9.17396    24.46683 
                 | 
      tt#frr#c.Q | 
            1 1  |   .5521956   .0546513    10.10   0.000     .4450723     .659319 
            1 2  |   .2606876   .0368514     7.07   0.000     .1884543     .332921 
            1 3  |   .4216873   .0394525    10.69   0.000     .3443554    .4990191 
            1 4  |   .3748762   .0317683    11.80   0.000     .3126065     .437146 
            1 5  |   .4126928   .0349147    11.82   0.000     .3442558    .4811298 
            1 6  |   .0300128   .0593263     0.51   0.613     -.086274    .1462996 
            1 7  |   .3918569   .0340772    11.50   0.000     .3250614    .4586524 
            1 8  |   .2815183   .0445083     6.33   0.000     .1942765    .3687601 
            1 9  |   .3110777   .0405372     7.67   0.000     .2316197    .3905357 
            2 1  |   .4515241   .0449482    10.05   0.000     .3634202    .5396281 
            2 2  |   .2523389   .0317714     7.94   0.000      .190063    .3146148 
            2 3  |    .376848   .0348753    10.81   0.000      .308488    .4452079 
61 
            2 4  |   .3735107   .0284328    13.14   0.000      .317779    .4292424 
            2 5  |   .3684931     .03093    11.91   0.000     .3078664    .4291198 
            2 6  |    .199599   .0522959     3.82   0.000     .0970927    .3021054 
            2 7  |   .3815201   .0298181    12.79   0.000     .3230729    .4399674 
            2 8  |   .3344778   .0419954     7.96   0.000     .2521616     .416794 
            2 9  |   .3239379   .0342795     9.45   0.000     .2567459      .39113 
            3 1  |   .4703609   .0455697    10.32   0.000     .3810386    .5596832 
            3 2  |   .2767264   .0297973     9.29   0.000     .2183199    .3351329 
            3 3  |   .3678129   .0337407    10.90   0.000     .3016769    .4339489 
            3 4  |   .4239147   .0283236    14.97   0.000      .368397    .4794323 
            3 5  |   .3501621   .0299514    11.69   0.000     .2914537    .4088705 
            3 6  |   .2883242   .0586789     4.91   0.000     .1733064     .403342 
            3 7  |   .3733822   .0282067    13.24   0.000     .3180935    .4286709 
            3 8  |   .3640311   .0441553     8.24   0.000     .2774812    .4505809 
            3 9  |   .3376639   .0364564     9.26   0.000     .2662048     .409123 
            4 1  |   .5463939   .0406648    13.44   0.000     .4666859    .6261019 
            4 2  |   .3288732   .0287497    11.44   0.000     .2725202    .3852261 
            4 3  |   .5037665   .0309935    16.25   0.000     .4430153    .5645176 
            4 4  |   .4800651   .0255469    18.79   0.000       .42999    .5301403 
            4 5  |   .4446025   .0297854    14.93   0.000     .3862194    .5029856 
            4 6  |   .3681506    .057713     6.38   0.000      .255026    .4812751 
            4 7  |   .4955531   .0280342    17.68   0.000     .4406027    .5505036 
            4 8  |   .4447736   .0395778    11.24   0.000     .3671962     .522351 
            4 9  |   .3986365   .0329996    12.08   0.000     .3339532    .4633197 
            5 1  |   .6433539   .0392256    16.40   0.000     .5664669    .7202409 
            5 2  |   .3826591   .0292816    13.07   0.000     .3252635    .4400548 
            5 3  |     .53619   .0286814    18.69   0.000     .4799709    .5924091 
            5 4  |   .5941359   .0263666    22.53   0.000     .5424541    .6458177 
            5 5  |   .3853159   .0302218    12.75   0.000     .3260773    .4445544 
            5 6  |   .4684579   .0576218     8.13   0.000     .3555121    .5814038 
            5 7  |    .417567   .0267366    15.62   0.000     .3651599    .4699741 
            5 8  |   .4253996   .0382444    11.12   0.000     .3504359    .5003633 
            5 9  |   .4263426   .0341173    12.50   0.000     .3594685    .4932166 
            6 1  |   .6926212   .0398116    17.40   0.000     .6145855    .7706568 
            6 2  |   .4593868   .0346669    13.25   0.000     .3914354    .5273382 
            6 3  |   .5676918   .0297992    19.05   0.000     .5092816    .6261019 
            6 4  |    .667068   .0288387    23.13   0.000     .6105406    .7235953 
            6 5  |    .355544   .0345536    10.29   0.000     .2878146    .4232733 
            6 6  |   .5250769   .0622085     8.44   0.000     .4031406    .6470132 
            6 7  |   .4272096   .0296884    14.39   0.000     .3690168    .4854025 
            6 8  |   .3852534   .0396055     9.73   0.000     .3076217    .4628851 
            6 9  |   .3891919   .0352614    11.04   0.000     .3200753    .4583086 
            7 1  |   .6422732   .0353246    18.18   0.000     .5730325    .7115138 
            7 2  |   .3580747   .0307958    11.63   0.000     .2977111    .4184383 
            7 3  |    .477295   .0267734    17.83   0.000     .4248159    .5297742 
            7 4  |   .6079708   .0257131    23.64   0.000     .5575699    .6583717 
            7 5  |    .274783   .0281583     9.76   0.000     .2195893    .3299766 
            7 6  |   .4009401   .0484864     8.27   0.000     .3059008    .4959794 
            7 7  |    .353462   .0268899    13.14   0.000     .3007546    .4061694 
            7 8  |   .3527236   .0344629    10.23   0.000     .2851721    .4202751 
            7 9  |   .3466816   .0327237    10.59   0.000     .2825391    .4108241 
            8 1  |   .5954233    .033708    17.66   0.000     .5293514    .6614952 
            8 2  |   .3650462   .0322851    11.31   0.000     .3017634     .428329 
            8 3  |   .4389058    .026811    16.37   0.000     .3863528    .4914587 
            8 4  |   .5892219   .0259468    22.71   0.000     .5383629    .6400808 
            8 5  |   .2472611   .0301463     8.20   0.000     .1881706    .3063517 
            8 6  |   .3919635   .0407724     9.61   0.000     .3120445    .4718825 
            8 7  |   .3437682   .0301967    11.38   0.000      .284579    .4029574 
            8 8  |   .3717096   .0320347    11.60   0.000     .3089176    .4345016 
            8 9  |    .329237   .0312326    10.54   0.000     .2680173    .3904568 
            9 1  |    .648726   .0345945    18.75   0.000     .5809164    .7165356 
            9 2  |   .4108188   .0332345    12.36   0.000     .3456751    .4759626 
            9 3  |   .4339478   .0275817    15.73   0.000     .3798842    .4880115 
            9 4  |   .6386783    .025588    24.96   0.000     .5885226    .6888339 
            9 5  |   .3163079   .0309896    10.21   0.000     .2555644    .3770513 
            9 6  |   .4207149   .0383971    10.96   0.000     .3454519    .4959779 
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            9 7  |   .3504304   .0320198    10.94   0.000     .2876676    .4131931 
            9 8  |   .4145591   .0313962    13.20   0.000     .3530187    .4760996 
            9 9  |    .428509    .032596    13.15   0.000     .3646169     .492401 
           10 1  |   .6424845   .0429877    14.95   0.000     .5582234    .7267456 
           10 2  |   .4059606   .0347592    11.68   0.000     .3378282    .4740929 
           10 3  |   .4735015   .0309111    15.32   0.000      .412912     .534091 
           10 4  |   .6292858   .0299308    21.02   0.000     .5706178    .6879539 
           10 5  |   .2823415   .0325419     8.68   0.000     .2185554    .3461276 
           10 6  |   .3482029     .04842     7.19   0.000     .2532937    .4431121 
           10 7  |   .3153912   .0339511     9.29   0.000     .2488428    .3819396 
           10 8  |   .4114521   .0359555    11.44   0.000     .3409749    .4819292 
           10 9  |   .4125076   .0358226    11.52   0.000     .3422909    .4827243 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPlsqrPn |   .1443595   .0942515     1.53   0.126     -.040385    .3291041 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPfsqrPl |  -2.199131   .6354168    -3.46   0.001    -3.444626   -.9536357 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPpsqrPl |  -.9669119   .4712696    -2.05   0.040    -1.890659   -.0431651 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPasqrPl |   3.495488   1.083703     3.23   0.001     1.371297    5.619679 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPesqrPl |   .4703926   .1246618     3.77   0.000     .2260401    .7147451 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPfsqrPn |    6.44303   1.069104     6.03   0.000     4.347455    8.538606 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPesqrPn |   -.275418   .1731423    -1.59   0.112    -.6147984    .0639624 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPasqrPn |   -10.7193   1.763739    -6.08   0.000    -14.17645   -7.262153 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPpsqrPn |   4.563278   .7312291     6.24   0.000     3.129979    5.996578 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPpsqrPf |   .5459932   3.799499     0.14   0.886    -6.901495    7.993482 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPesqrPf |   1.812575   .9795786     1.85   0.064    -.1075199     3.73267 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPasqrPf |  -14.01634   9.237277    -1.52   0.129    -32.12255    4.089862 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPesqrPp |   .6433513   .6829624     0.94   0.346    -.6953395    1.982042 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPasqrPp |  -.5763611   5.971546    -0.10   0.923    -12.28133    11.12861 
                 | 
c.Q#c.sqrPasqrPe |  -2.153533   1.619419    -1.33   0.184    -5.327794    1.020728 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Pnsqrt |   1.099481   .2845714     3.86   0.000     .5416856    1.657276 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Plsqrt |   .2083805   .1863117     1.12   0.263    -.1568134    .5735744 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Pfsqrt |  -1.053999   .8629403    -1.22   0.222    -2.745468     .637471 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Ppsqrt |  -.7737278   .4523317    -1.71   0.087    -1.660354    .1128984 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Pesqrt |   .2226062   .2086789     1.07   0.286    -.1864301    .6316426 
                 | 
    c.Q#c.Pasqrt |   1.211541   1.294783     0.94   0.349    -1.326394    3.749477 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Pnt |  -.0876379   .0188399    -4.65   0.000    -.1245665   -.0507094 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Plt |  -.0298979   .0137454    -2.18   0.030    -.0568406   -.0029552 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Pft |   .0743804   .0548717     1.36   0.175    -.0331748    .1819356 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Ppt |   .0298891   .0289638     1.03   0.302    -.0268836    .0866617 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Pet |   .0116715   .0141088     0.83   0.408    -.0159835    .0393264 
                 | 
       c.Q#c.Pat |  -.0826036   .0815945    -1.01   0.311     -.242539    .0773318 
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                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PnsqrK |   -.477106   2.713136    -0.18   0.860    -5.795188    4.840976 
                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PlsqrK |  -4.806809   1.280773    -3.75   0.000    -7.317283   -2.296336 
                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PfsqrK |   4.497123    11.3141     0.40   0.691    -17.67992    26.67417 
                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PpsqrK |  -5.985334   6.540013    -0.92   0.360    -18.80457    6.833901 
                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PesqrK |   9.253771   2.351104     3.94   0.000     4.645317    13.86223 
                 | 
 c.sqrQ#c.PasqrK |  -6.484956   17.75283    -0.37   0.715     -41.2827    28.31279 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PnsqrKT |  -.3018563    .273194    -1.10   0.269    -.8373502    .2336377 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PlsqrKT |   .3772589   .1424547     2.65   0.008     .0980302    .6564877 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PfsqrKT |   .0502526   1.086406     0.05   0.963    -2.079238    2.179743 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PpsqrKT |    .745846   .6082737     1.23   0.220    -.4464456    1.938138 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PesqrKT |  -.6605999   .2387523    -2.77   0.006    -1.128584   -.1926158 
                 | 
c.sqrQ#c.PasqrKT |   .2535298    1.69378     0.15   0.881    -3.066489    3.573548 
                 | 
             PnK |   3.828005     2.0672     1.85   0.064    -.2239626    7.879972 
             PlK |   4.384247   .8136466     5.39   0.000     2.789399    5.979095 
             PfK |   -9.79959   8.535979    -1.15   0.251    -26.53116    6.931985 
             PpK |    2.61945    5.24104     0.50   0.617    -7.653636    12.89254 
             PeK |  -6.774833   1.661997    -4.08   0.000    -10.03255   -3.517113 
             PaK |   11.42966    13.6379     0.84   0.402    -15.30231    38.16164 
           _cons |  -670.8342   13652.05    -0.05   0.961    -27430.54    26088.88 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
L_Q              | 
  sqrPnDsqrPl_d5 |    .229153   .0159365    14.38   0.000     .1979155    .2603905 
  sqrPfDsqrPl_d5 |   .0103068   .0030366     3.39   0.001     .0043546     .016259 
  sqrPpDsqrPl_d5 |   .0286503   .0018481    15.50   0.000     .0250278    .0322728 
  sqrPeDsqrPl_d5 |   .0016705   .0021178     0.79   0.430    -.0024806    .0058217 
  sqrPaDsqrPl_d5 |   .0441967   .0043075    10.26   0.000     .0357536    .0526399 
            sqrt |  -.0917676    .022046    -4.16   0.000    -.1349805   -.0485547 
               t |   .0002155   .0017065     0.13   0.900    -.0031295    .0035605 
       sqrK_sqrQ |  -.6627102   .1291603    -5.13   0.000    -.9158804   -.4095401 
         sqrKT_Q |   .2602897   .0278507     9.35   0.000     .2056988    .3148805 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              1  |  -1.57e-18   8.31e-18    -0.19   0.850    -1.79e-17    1.47e-17 
              2  |  -.3195719   .0143696   -22.24   0.000     -.347738   -.2914057 
              3  |  -.3219543   .0143804   -22.39   0.000    -.3501417   -.2937669 
              4  |  -.2559004   .0146883   -17.42   0.000    -.2846913   -.2271095 
              5  |  -.4420589   .0132721   -33.31   0.000    -.4680739    -.416044 
              6  |   -.390709   .0174434   -22.40   0.000    -.4249002   -.3565178 
              7  |  -.4878941   .0107106   -45.55   0.000    -.5088882      -.4669 
              8  |  -.3918957   .0138998   -28.19   0.000     -.419141   -.3646504 
              9  |  -.4171898   .0123812   -33.70   0.000    -.4414585    -.392921 
                 | 
           _cons |   .5961614   .0744455     8.01   0.000     .4502389    .7420838 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
N_Q              | 
  sqrPlDsqrPn_d5 |    .229153   .0159365    14.38   0.000     .1979155    .2603905 
  sqrPfDsqrPn_d5 |   .0915574   .0047748    19.18   0.000     .0821982    .1009167 
  sqrPpDsqrPn_d5 |   .0630354   .0030709    20.53   0.000     .0570159    .0690548 
  sqrPeDsqrPn_d5 |  -.0037838    .002903    -1.30   0.192    -.0094741    .0019065 
  sqrPaDsqrPn_d5 |    .157823   .0069022    22.87   0.000     .1442938    .1713521 
            sqrt |  -.2364703   .0262826    -9.00   0.000    -.2879876   -.1849531 
               t |    .039221   .0020251    19.37   0.000     .0352516    .0431905 
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       sqrK_sqrQ |   4.171593   .1573099    26.52   0.000     3.863246     4.47994 
         sqrKT_Q |  -.5175308   .0340219   -15.21   0.000    -.5842179   -.4508437 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              1  |   4.26e-16   1.30e-17    32.89   0.000     4.01e-16    4.52e-16 
              2  |   .0347374   .0170952     2.03   0.042     .0012288    .0682461 
              3  |  -.0932074   .0176709    -5.27   0.000    -.1278446   -.0585702 
              4  |   -.005913   .0176479    -0.34   0.738    -.0405051    .0286792 
              5  |  -.1163547   .0154915    -7.51   0.000      -.14672   -.0859894 
              6  |   .0401451   .0208417     1.93   0.054    -.0007072    .0809975 
              7  |   .1296789   .0125468    10.34   0.000     .1050856    .1542721 
              8  |   .1970015   .0164626    11.97   0.000     .1647327    .2292702 
              9  |   .0040699   .0142659     0.29   0.775    -.0238929    .0320328 
                 | 
           _cons |  -.3807629   .0865817    -4.40   0.000    -.5504737    -.211052 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
F_Q              | 
  sqrPlDsqrPf_d5 |   .0103068   .0030366     3.39   0.001     .0043546     .016259 
  sqrPnDsqrPf_d5 |   .0915574   .0047748    19.18   0.000     .0821982    .1009167 
  sqrPpDsqrPf_d5 |   .0309812   .0012126    25.55   0.000     .0286043     .033358 
  sqrPeDsqrPf_d5 |   .0323765   .0015591    20.77   0.000     .0293206    .0354324 
  sqrPaDsqrPf_d5 |  -.0305005   .0026555   -11.49   0.000    -.0357056   -.0252954 
            sqrt |  -.0137138   .0028693    -4.78   0.000    -.0193381   -.0080895 
               t |  -.0006313   .0002259    -2.80   0.005    -.0010741   -.0001886 
       sqrK_sqrQ |  -.0572862   .0182959    -3.13   0.002    -.0931484   -.0214241 
         sqrKT_Q |   .0351193   .0037561     9.35   0.000     .0277567    .0424818 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              1  |   1.81e-16   5.27e-18    34.35   0.000     1.71e-16    1.91e-16 
              2  |   .0234335   .0018695    12.53   0.000     .0197691    .0270979 
              3  |   .0156573    .001919     8.16   0.000     .0118958    .0194189 
              4  |   .0211712   .0019221    11.01   0.000     .0174038    .0249387 
              5  |   .0361401   .0017384    20.79   0.000     .0327327    .0395475 
              6  |   .0313745    .002259    13.89   0.000     .0269465    .0358025 
              7  |   .0050374   .0014022     3.59   0.000      .002289    .0077858 
              8  |   .0201371   .0018038    11.16   0.000     .0166015    .0236727 
              9  |   .0384393   .0015804    24.32   0.000     .0353414    .0415371 
                 | 
           _cons |   .0116529   .0095093     1.23   0.220    -.0069865    .0302923 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
E_Q              | 
  sqrPlDsqrPe_d5 |   .0016705   .0021178     0.79   0.430    -.0024806    .0058217 
  sqrPfDsqrPe_d5 |   .0323765   .0015591    20.77   0.000     .0293206    .0354324 
  sqrPpDsqrPe_d5 |   .0088489   .0014972     5.91   0.000     .0059141    .0117836 
  sqrPnDsqrPe_d5 |  -.0037838    .002903    -1.30   0.192    -.0094741    .0019065 
  sqrPaDsqrPe_d5 |   .0328899   .0014411    22.82   0.000     .0300653    .0357146 
            sqrt |   -.009292   .0012373    -7.51   0.000    -.0117173   -.0068667 
               t |   .0010582   .0000965    10.97   0.000     .0008691    .0012474 
       sqrK_sqrQ |   .0975929   .0094625    10.31   0.000     .0790452    .1161407 
         sqrKT_Q |   .0029794   .0016231     1.84   0.066    -.0002021    .0061608 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              1  |  -4.07e-17   2.85e-18   -14.25   0.000    -4.63e-17   -3.51e-17 
              2  |  -.0047485   .0008336    -5.70   0.000    -.0063825   -.0031145 
              3  |   .0000289   .0008131     0.04   0.972    -.0015648    .0016227 
              4  |   .0016009   .0008163     1.96   0.050     8.55e-07     .003201 
              5  |  -.0163897   .0007849   -20.88   0.000    -.0179281   -.0148513 
              6  |  -.0016191   .0009771    -1.66   0.098    -.0035343    .0002961 
              7  |  -.0166025   .0006183   -26.85   0.000    -.0178144   -.0153906 
              8  |  -.0129445   .0007892   -16.40   0.000    -.0144913   -.0113976 
              9  |   -.010746   .0007023   -15.30   0.000    -.0121225   -.0093694 
                 | 
           _cons |  -.0087642   .0044655    -1.96   0.050    -.0175172   -.0000113 
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-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
PE_Q             | 
  sqrPlDsqrPp_d5 |   .0286503   .0018481    15.50   0.000     .0250278    .0322728 
  sqrPfDsqrPp_d5 |   .0309812   .0012126    25.55   0.000     .0286043     .033358 
  sqrPnDsqrPp_d5 |   .0630354   .0030709    20.53   0.000     .0570159    .0690548 
  sqrPeDsqrPp_d5 |   .0088489   .0014972     5.91   0.000     .0059141    .0117836 
  sqrPaDsqrPp_d5 |  -.0332344   .0014938   -22.25   0.000    -.0361624   -.0303064 
            sqrt |  -.0023509    .001486    -1.58   0.114    -.0052636    .0005618 
               t |  -.0000154   .0001169    -0.13   0.895    -.0002446    .0002137 
       sqrK_sqrQ |   .0028804   .0106979     0.27   0.788    -.0180888    .0238496 
         sqrKT_Q |   .0060771   .0019499     3.12   0.002     .0022551    .0098991 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              1  |  -2.01e-17   2.31e-18    -8.68   0.000    -2.46e-17   -1.56e-17 
              2  |   .0130861   .0009844    13.29   0.000     .0111566    .0150156 
              3  |   .0086312   .0009935     8.69   0.000     .0066838    .0105786 
              4  |    .002411   .0009969     2.42   0.016      .000457    .0043651 
              5  |   .0091895   .0009108    10.09   0.000     .0074042    .0109748 
              6  |   .0418162   .0011756    35.57   0.000     .0395119    .0441204 
              7  |  -.0005896   .0007343    -0.80   0.422    -.0020288    .0008496 
              8  |   .0045896   .0009432     4.87   0.000     .0027408    .0064385 
              9  |   .0065155   .0008252     7.90   0.000      .004898     .008133 
                 | 
           _cons |  -.0195591   .0050948    -3.84   0.000    -.0295455   -.0095727 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
A_Q              | 
  sqrPlDsqrPa_d5 |   .0441967   .0043075    10.26   0.000     .0357536    .0526399 
  sqrPfDsqrPa_d5 |  -.0305005   .0026555   -11.49   0.000    -.0357056   -.0252954 
  sqrPpDsqrPa_d5 |  -.0332344   .0014938   -22.25   0.000    -.0361624   -.0303064 
  sqrPeDsqrPa_d5 |   .0328899   .0014411    22.82   0.000     .0300653    .0357146 
  sqrPnDsqrPa_d5 |    .157823   .0069022    22.87   0.000     .1442938    .1713521 
            sqrt |  -.0150632   .0038398    -3.92   0.000    -.0225897   -.0075367 
               t |  -.0006851   .0003027    -2.26   0.024    -.0012785   -.0000917 
       sqrK_sqrQ |  -.0526104   .0239005    -2.20   0.028    -.0994583   -.0057625 
         sqrKT_Q |   .0386315   .0050238     7.69   0.000     .0287842    .0484788 
             K_Q |  -.0130845   .0052563    -2.49   0.013    -.0233875   -.0027816 
                 | 
             frr | 
              2  |    .036492   .0025087    14.55   0.000     .0315747    .0414093 
              3  |   .0247548   .0025729     9.62   0.000     .0197116     .029798 
              4  |   .0230105     .00258     8.92   0.000     .0179534    .0280676 
              5  |   .0436666    .002337    18.69   0.000     .0390859    .0482474 
              6  |   .0761872   .0030356    25.10   0.000      .070237    .0821374 
              7  |   .0040627    .001882     2.16   0.031     .0003738    .0077516 
              8  |    .023425   .0024176     9.69   0.000     .0186862    .0281638 
              9  |   .0425642   .0021229    20.05   0.000     .0384031    .0467252 
                 | 
           _cons |   .0239295   .0125848     1.90   0.057    -.0007383    .0485973 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. #delim cr 
delimiter now cr 
.  
. est sto GLC 
 
PREDICTED MARGINS 
 
. margins frr, predict(xb equation(L_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(L_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
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             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .5960202   .0085907    69.38   0.000     .5791814    .6128591 
          2  |   .2764484   .0112559    24.56   0.000     .2543855    .2985113 
          3  |   .2740659   .0121984    22.47   0.000     .2501556    .2979762 
          4  |   .3401198   .0119553    28.45   0.000      .316686    .3635537 
          5  |   .1539613   .0095773    16.08   0.000     .1351886     .172734 
          6  |   .2053113   .0147623    13.91   0.000     .1763754    .2342471 
          7  |   .1081262   .0062955    17.18   0.000     .0957862    .1204661 
          8  |   .2041245   .0107128    19.05   0.000      .183126     .225123 
          9  |   .1788305   .0082349    21.72   0.000      .162689     .194972 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 est sto LND 
 
est restore GLC 
 
margins frr, predict(xb equation(N_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(N_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .6118183   .0098721    61.97   0.000     .5924678    .6311687 
          2  |   .6465557   .0138607    46.65   0.000     .6193871    .6737243 
          3  |   .5186109   .0150028    34.57   0.000     .4892035    .5480182 
          4  |   .6059053   .0148068    40.92   0.000     .5768822    .6349284 
          5  |   .4954636   .0117554    42.15   0.000     .4724215    .5185057 
          6  |   .6519634   .0182092    35.80   0.000     .6162711    .6876557 
          7  |   .7414971   .0077389    95.81   0.000     .7263279    .7566663 
          8  |   .8088197   .0131954    61.30   0.000     .7829551    .8346844 
          9  |   .6158882   .0100234    61.44   0.000      .596241    .6355354 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 est sto LAB 
 
 est restore GLC 
 margins frr, predict(xb equation(F_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(F_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .0332882   .0010959    30.37   0.000       .03114    .0354364 
          2  |   .0567217   .0015129    37.49   0.000     .0537562    .0596872 
          3  |   .0489455   .0016289    30.05   0.000     .0457526    .0521384 
          4  |   .0544595   .0016002    34.03   0.000     .0513228    .0575961 
          5  |   .0694283   .0012893    53.85   0.000     .0669011    .0719556 
          6  |   .0646627   .0019584    33.02   0.000     .0608241    .0685014 
          7  |   .0383256   .0008461    45.30   0.000     .0366671    .0399841 
          8  |   .0534253   .0014284    37.40   0.000     .0506255    .0562251 
          9  |   .0717275   .0010927    65.64   0.000     .0695856    .0738694 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
est store FERT 
 
67 
est restore GLC 
 
 margins frr, predict(xb equation(PE_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(PE_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .0162352   .0005745    28.26   0.000     .0151091    .0173613 
          2  |   .0293213   .0007981    36.74   0.000     .0277569    .0308857 
          3  |   .0248664   .0008441    29.46   0.000      .023212    .0265209 
          4  |   .0186462    .000829    22.49   0.000     .0170212    .0202713 
          5  |   .0254247   .0006695    37.98   0.000     .0241125    .0267369 
          6  |   .0580514   .0010153    57.18   0.000     .0560613    .0600414 
          7  |   .0156456   .0004388    35.65   0.000     .0147854    .0165058 
          8  |   .0208249   .0007416    28.08   0.000     .0193712    .0222785 
          9  |   .0227507   .0005645    40.30   0.000     .0216441    .0238572 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
est store PEST 
 
est restore GLC 
 
margins frr, predict(xb equation(E_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(E_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .0542634   .0004857   111.71   0.000     .0533113    .0552155 
          2  |   .0495149   .0006722    73.66   0.000     .0481974    .0508325 
          3  |   .0542923   .0007018    77.36   0.000     .0529168    .0556679 
          4  |   .0558643   .0006811    82.02   0.000     .0545293    .0571994 
          5  |   .0378737   .0005642    67.12   0.000     .0367678    .0389797 
          6  |   .0526443   .0008328    63.21   0.000     .0510119    .0542767 
          7  |   .0376609   .0003655   103.05   0.000     .0369446    .0383773 
          8  |   .0413189   .0006102    67.71   0.000     .0401228    .0425151 
          9  |   .0435175   .0004674    93.11   0.000     .0426014    .0444335 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
est store ENER 
 
est restore GLC 
 
margins frr, predict(xb equation(A_Q)) post 
 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =      2,160 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict(xb equation(A_Q)) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         frr | 
          1  |   .0499426   .0014742    33.88   0.000     .0470531    .0528322 
          2  |   .0864346   .0020222    42.74   0.000      .082471    .0903983 
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          3  |   .0746974   .0021841    34.20   0.000     .0704163    .0789785 
          4  |   .0729531   .0021453    34.01   0.000     .0687481    .0771581 
          5  |   .0936092   .0017287    54.15   0.000     .0902208    .0969977 
          6  |   .1261298   .0026275    48.00   0.000     .1209796    .1312801 
          7  |   .0540053   .0011316    47.72   0.000     .0517872    .0562234 
          8  |   .0733676   .0019133    38.35   0.000     .0696174    .0771179 
          9  |   .0925068    .001464    63.19   0.000     .0896371    .0953765 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
est store AGCHEM 
 
 
. estout LND LAB FERT PEST ENER AGCHEM, cells(b(star fmt(%9.3f)) se(par)) starlevels(* 
0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01)  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------- 
        LND             LAB            FERT            PEST         ENER          AGCHEM    
BR 0.596*** 0.612*** 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 
 (0.009)   (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)        (0.001)    
FR 0.276*** 0.647*** 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.050*** 0.086*** 
 (0.011)  (0.014)        (0.002)        (0.001)        (0.001)  (0.002)    
NGP 0.274*** 0.519*** 0.049*** 0.025*** 0.054*** 0.075*** 
 (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.002)        (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)    
PG 0.340*** 0.606*** 0.054*** 0.019*** 0.056*** 0.073*** 
 (0.012)  (0.015)        (0.002)         (0.001) (0.001)         (0.002)    
HL 0.154*** 0.495*** 0.069*** 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.094*** 
 (0.010)         (0.012) (0.001)         (0.001) (0.001)         (0.002)    
MP 0.205*** 0.652*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.126*** 
 (0.015)         (0.018) (0.002)         (0.001) (0.001)         (0.003)    
NC 0.108*** 0.741*** 0.038*** 0.016*** 0.038*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006)         (0.008) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)    
EU 0.204*** 0.809*** 0.053*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.073*** 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)    
SS 0.179*** 0.616*** 0.072*** 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.093*** 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
 
